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IN THE SUPREME· COURT
of the State of Utah

JAMES C. WHITTAKER,·
PZaintiff,

-vs.RICHARD H. SPENCER, (in whose
name RICHARD LEO SPENCER, as
Administrator has been substituted,
JOHN EDISON SPENCER, ELIZABETH A. TIBBS, VORD SPENCER,
IRWIN M. PRICE, SIMON RUGENTOBLER, (in whose place Que Jensen
has been substituted, INDIANOLA
IRRIGATION COMPANY and the
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This action was commenced on J nly 21st, 1941 by
the plaintiff to quiet his claim to 60 acres or shares of
primary or class ''A'' water in Thistle Creek and its
tributaries. These creeks rise in the northern end of
Sanpete County and when not diverte'd for irrigation
flow northerly into Spainsh Fork River and thence into
Utah Lake.
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Simon Hugentobler .was made a party ~efend~nt
because he held a mortgage on a tract of ~and owned by
Richard Spencer, together with 55 shares or acres of
primary class "A" water right in Thistle Creek and
its tributaries.
Prior to the trail of this cause Simon Hugentobler
conveyed his interest in the water of Thistle Creek and
its tributaries to Que Jensen who was subsituted for
Simon Hugentobler.
Prior to the trial of the cause Richard H. Spencer
died and Richard Leo Spencer, having been appointed
administrator of the estate of his father Richard H.
Spencer was substituted as a defendant for his deceased father.
J. Vord Spencer, a son of Richard H~ Spencer, did
not claim any interest in the controversy, except as an
heir of Richard H. Spencer, deceased.
The Indianola Irrigation Company is a mutual
irrigation company and as such distributes the waters
of Thistle Creek and its tributaries ·to its stockholders
who own land adjacent to said creek.
By his pleadings Richard Leo Spencer' claimed all
of the waters in controversy but during the course of
the trail it was agreed by his counsel that Que Jensen,
as successor in interest of Simon Hugentobler, was
entitled to 55 acres or shares of the waters in question.

By his pleadings defendant, Irwin M. Price claimed
to be the owner of. 160 shares of the water in dispute,
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but during the course of the trail he disclaimed any
right to such stocks.
By his pleadings defendant John Edison Spencer
claimed to be the owner of the water in controversy, but
that eighty shares of the water was to be conveyed to
his sister Elizabeth A. Tibbs, when and if he established
a right thereto. During the course of the trial counsel
for defendants, John Edi'Son Spencer and Elizabeth A.
Tibbs, conceded that Que Jensen, as the successor of
Simon Hugentobler, was entitled to 5·5 shares or actes
of the water right in controversy.

Elizabeth A. Tibbs claims the right to 80 shares of
the water in controversy because of an agreement had
between John Edison Spencer, Irwin M. Price and her
father, Richard H. Spencer, and because her father
Richard H. Spencer, by a warranty deed conveyed to
her 80 acres of land to which she claims 80 shares or
acres of the water in dispute is appurtenant.
In order that the court may more readily understand what appellants, John Edison 'Spencer and
Elizabeth A. Tibbs, claim for the evidence, which we
shall presently summarize, we at ifue outset claim:
1. That the plaintiff, James C. Whittaker, does
not have any title to the 60 shares of water right to
which he s·eeks to quiet title because:

(a) The mortgage under which he claims title was
and is void for uncertainty as to any sixty acres or
shares of water :
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(b) 'The decree of foreclosure of the mortgage
under which he claims title is void for uncertainty:
(c) The sheriff's deed which.was issued pursuant
to the decree of foreclosure is void for uncertainty in
so far as it affects the 60 shares or acres of water
right:
(d) The deed to the plaintiff from the grantee in
the sheriff's deed to the 60 shares or acres of water
right claimed by the plaintiff is void for uncertainty.
2. That the water right in controversy, other than
the 55 shares to which Que J,ensen is entitled, is appurtenant to land which Richard H. Spencer, during his
lifetime, conveyed to John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs and as such 80 shares or acres belongs
to Elizabeth A. Tibbs and the remainder to John Edison
Spencer.
3. That even if the water right is not appurtenant to the land conveyed to Elizabeth A. Tibbs and John
Edison Spencer, they own the right to such waters by
reason of the delivery of the stock certificate to John
Edison 8pencer..
The record in this case is somewhat lengthy. Much
of the evidence is not in conflict. We shall direct the
at•tention of the court to those portions of the ~vidence
that we deem necessary to an understanding of the
matters which divide the parties to this litigation.
On June 21st, 1918 the persons who claimed a
water right in Thistle Creek and Hs tributaries exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ecuted Articles of Incorporation of the Indianola Irrigation Company. (See plaintiff's Exhibit 7). By
such articles it was provided among other things:
''ARTICLE 5
The capital stock of this corporation shall
be $80,000. Eighty Thousand Dollars divided
into Twenty Two Hundred shares, as follows:
Eighteen Hundred shares of class ''A'' stock, of
the par value of Forty Dollars per share, and
Four Hundred shares of class '' B '' stock of the
par value of Twenty Dollars per share.''
~'ARTICLE

6

The purpose for which this corporation is
formed, and the pursuits and business to be
engaged in, is to manage, regulate, control and
distribute the waters of Thistle Creek, its branches and tributaries in Sanpete County, to which
it shall be entitled, to and among its stockholders
in proportion to their and each of their respective rights to the use thereof, to construct
and maintain all. such dams, ditches, canals, gates,
reservoirs, flumes and other and different structures and means which may be found necessary
or convenient for the domestic and other purposes.''
"ARTICLE 18
Subscription to the capital stock of this corporation, by ;the persons above ·named, are made
by each of such persons conveying to this corporation by good and sufficient deed one acre
of primary water rights from the waters of ·
Thistle Creek, its branches and tributaries, for
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every share of class ''A'' stock, subscribed for
by him, which said water right is taken andreceived by this corporation at ~the price and vaula..
tion of Forty Dollars per acre of such primary
water rights as fully paid up subscription for
such stock. And one acre of secondary water
right from the above mentioned sources for every
share of class '' B'' stock subscribed for by him,
which said water rights are taken and received
by this corporation at the price and valuation of
Twenty Dollars per acre of such secondary water
rights as fully paid up subcription for such stock,
and future subscriptions to any capital stock
of this corporation shall be made only, upon the
above terms. And the Board of Directors shall
in all cases determine the sufficiency of waterrights to be received by the corporation for subscriptions for its stock. The waters hereinbefore referred to, include the waters from Thistle,
Rock and Clear ·Creeks, their branches and tributaries. '' ·

''ARTICLE 19
The Board of Directors shall cause the
waters owned by this corporation to be distributed and divided to and among its stockholders,
at the rate and in the proportion of stock held by
each person, in the following manner, to wit:
from and after the first day of Mareh, to and
including the 15th day of June each and every
year, all the waters owned ·by this corporation,
shaliJ. be divided among, and distributed to the
stockholders of this corporation, both to class
A and class B equally, pro-rate, and in
proportion to the amount of stock held by each
person. Froni and Biter the 15th day of June, to
and including the first day of March, following,

·J
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during each and every year, the owners of class
A stock of this corporation, shall be entitled,
as a first right, to an amount of water equal
to 1/40 of a second foot of water for every share
of class A stock of this corporation, held by
him, or if there shall not be sufficient water,
owned by this corporation, to fully supply said
amount, then such water as may be available,
shall be divided and distributed to the holders
of said class A stock, pro-rate and in the·
proporation to the amount of said class A stock
held by each person. And if, after aJll of class
A stock, shall first have been fully supplied
with the amount of water above stated, there
shall at anytime be a surplus of water, over and
above what will fully supply all of clas·s A
stock, as above stated, then such surplus water
shall be divided among and distributed to the
holders of class B stock, pro-rate and in proporation to the amount of said class B stock
held by each person.''
'

On May 6th, 1920 a decree was entered in the district court of Sanpete County in an action entitled:
"Indianola Irrigation Company, a corporation, et aL,
plaintiffs, vs. R. H. Spencer, et al., defendants.'' In
such decree it was, among other things, adjudged:
''It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that for the purposes of effecting a proper
and economical method of distributing the waters
of the aforesaid s·treams through said Indianola
Irrigation Company said stream shall be divided
into 1800 shares of class ''A'' stock, and 500
shares of class '' B '' stock and said stock shall
be divided between the parties hereto including
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
the stockholders of the Indianola Irrigation Company, as follows:"
Then follows a list of persons who are decreed
water rights to ~the total number of 17'28 shares of class
''A'' water right. R. H. Spencer, who is the same person as Richard H. Spencer, is awarded 448 shares of
class "A" stock. (See plaintiff's Exhibit" A".)
On January 23, 1922 defendant R. H. Spencer and
his wife, Annie H. Spencer, execute,d a mortgage to
Simon Hugentobler on Lot 4 of Section 5 and Lot 1
of Section 6, in Township 12 South, Range 4 Eas't, Salt
Lake Meridian, consisting of 77 acres, together with
55 shares of primary water right from the waters of
Thistle Creek· to secure the payment of a note for
$2577.91. That mortgage was recorded on January 12,
1922 in Sanpete County, Utah. (See Trs. pages 26 to 28).
On November 9th, 1926 Richard H. Spencer, who is
the same person as R. H. Spencer, and J. Vord Spencer,
Josie Spencer, his wife, H. M. Spencer and his wife
Ida Spencer gave a mortgage to the Federa~ Building
and Loan · Association, a corporation, together with
Two Hundred eighty-five ('285) shares of capital stock
of the Indianola Irrigation Company, a corporation,
also all water and water right appurtaining to or used
upon or in connection with the real estate described in
the mortgage. The land described in the mortgage is in
Sanpete County, Utah and particularly described as
follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Beginning 7.61 chains South from the North
East Corner of the South East Quarter of Section 5, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt
Lake 1\feridian, thence South 89 degrees West
18.79 chains; thence North 7.88 chains ; thence
West- 21.21 chains; thence South 20.00 chains;
thence East 40 chains ; thence North 12.39 chains
to the place of beginning, containing 59.46 acres,
more or less.
Also:
Beginning at a point 3.89 chains South from
the Southeast Corner of the Northeast Quarter
of Section 5, Township 12 South of Range 4
East, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah: thence West
1 degree South 18.79 chains; thence South 3.72
chains; thence East 1 degree North 18.79 chains;
thence North 3.72 chains to beginning, containing
7 acres, more or less.
Also:
Beginning at the Southeast corner of the
North East quarter of Section 5, in Township
12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian,
Utah, thence running West 3.50 chains, thence
North 2.17 chains ; thence West 1'5.29 chains ;
thence South 1.72 chains, thence East 4.44 chains,
thence South 25° East 3.60 chains; thence South
60° 45' West 1.50 chains ; thence West 4.65 chains,
thence South 0.34 of a chain; thence North 89°
East 18.79 chains; thence North 3.89 chains to
beginning, containing 7.54 acres, more or less.
Also:
The Southeast quarter of 'Section 8 in
Township 12 South of Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Meridian, Utah.
The land and water right above described were
given 1to secure a note for $14,266.50. ·That mortgage
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was recorded in Sanpete County, Utah on November
9, 1926. (See Trs. 29 to 3'5).
At the time R. H. Spencer executed the mortgage
above mentioned he also executed and delivered to the
Federal Building and Loan Association a written mstrument which is in words and figures as follows:
''ASSIGNMENT
''For value received I have bargained, sold,
assigned and transferred and by these presents
do bargain, sell, assign and transfer to the Federal Building and Loan Association, a Utah corporation, with its principal place of business in
Ogden, Utah, all of my right, title and interest
in and to Two Hundred Twenty Three (223)
shares of class ''A'' stock in the Indianola Irrigation Company in ·the State of Utah with its
principal place of business at Indianola, Sanpete County, State of Utah, and I further assign
to said Federal Building and Loan Association ·
any additional interest in said stock that may
accrue to me in said stock, which at this ~time is
unissued and should the same be issued I direct
that it be issued to the Federal Building and
Loan Association, and I hereby constitute and
appoint the Federal Building and Loan Association my true and lawful attorney irrevocably for
me instead to transfer said stock on the books
of said company with full power of substitution
and irrevocation.
Dated this 9th day of November, 1926.
Witness.
David Wilson /s/"
/s/ R. H. Spencer
(See Irrigation Co. Exhibit 1.)
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The other 62 shares of the 285 shares or acres of
water mortgaged to the Federal Building and Loan
Association belonged to H. M. Spencer and Eliz·abeth
Tibbs. ( Tr. 342 to 405.)
On ~lay 21, 1931 R. H. Spencer and his wife Annie
H. Spencer conveyed to the defendant Elizabeth A. Tibbs:
''The NE ~of the N'V1;4 of Section 3, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian,
containing 40 acres more or less.
Together with twenty acres of primary water
right from Clear Creek, Rock Creek and Thistle
Creek.''
That deed was recorded on May 21, 1931. ( Tr.35-36)
On October 16th, 1931 Henry M. Spencer, other-. wise known as H. M. Spencer, Ida Spencer, his wife,
Leo Harold Spencer and Fern Spencer, his wife, R. H.
Spencer and Annie H. Spencer, his wife, mortgaged
to W. H. Hadlock, State Bank Commissioner of Utah
the West Half of the Northeast Quarter, the Southeast
Quarter of the Northwest quarter and the North Half
of the South Half of Section Three (3), Township 12
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
containing 280 acres, subject to right of way of county
road.
''Together with all right of every kind and
nature, however evidenced to the use of water,
ditches and canals for the . irrigation of said
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prernis·es to which the mortgagors or said premises are now or may hereafter become entitled,
whether represented by certificates of s tock or
otherwise and together with sixty (60) shares or
acres of water right owned by R. H. Spencer in
the waters of Indianola Creek, 'Thistle Creek and
Rock Creeks in addition to water now used for
the irrigation of the abov-e described lands."
1

Thwt mortgage was given to secure a number of
notes, one for $2440.00, one for $4750.00, one for $1500.00;
one for $500.00; one for $1400.00; one for $t50.00 and
one for $5000.00.
That mortgage was recorded on October 21, 1931.
(Tr. 37 to 41).
By an instrument dated June 21, 1918 a number
of persons executed what purports to be a Deed of
Water Rights whereby they purported to convey to the
Indianola Irrigation Company certain water rights. The
conveyance recites that in consideration of certificates
of the capital stock of the Indianola Irrigation Company
the signers grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer and
quit claim to the Indianola Irrigation 'Company all of
their rights, titles, interest, claims and demands in and
to the waters of Thistle, Rock and · Clear Creeks and
their tributaries the respective amounts and classes
which are set opposite their names, together with all
ditches, can~ls, darns, gates, and all other appurtenances
her·etofore used in the controlling and distribution of
said water in accordance with the terms and conditions
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contained in the articles of incorporation of the Indianola
Irrigation Company.
. Among the signers of ~the conveyance were Richard
H. Spencer and his wife Annie Spencer. Through the
words : ''dated this 25th day of N ovemoor, 1931,'' there
is drawn in red ink a line. Under the name of Richard
H. Spencer and Annie Spencer the words "One Hundred and Sixty shares class A stock.''
The paper on which the names of Richard H.
Spencer and Annie Spencer appear is attached to the
conveyance. The acknowledgement was taken on June
1st, 1918, before H. F. Wall and shows that R. H.
Spencer and Annie >Spencer acknowledged ~the instrument on that day. (See Indianola Irrigation Co. Exhibit
5) That conveyance was read into the record and will
be found at pages 43 to 49 of the transcript.
On October 29, 1933 Richard H. Spencer and Ann!e
H. Spencer, his wife, conveyed to the defendant John
E. Spencer the South one-half of the Southwest Quarter
of Section 5, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt
Lake Meridian, together with 80 acres of water in what
is known as Thistle Creek. 'That deed was recorded on
June 22, 1933. (See page 51 and 52 of Trs.) On September 16, 1933 a deed was given to correct the description in the deed above referred (to in which later
deed the land conveyed is described as the North One
Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 5, Township
12 South, Range 4 East, Salt La~e Meridian, containing
80.00 acres. Together with 80 acres of water in what is
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known as 'l'histle · Creek. That deed was recorded on
September 21, 1933. (Tr. 2 to 54). The last mentioned
deed was offered and received in ev~dence as "John
Edison Spencer et al., Exhibit 12.''
Plaintiff offered and over objection of defendants
John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs, there was
received in evidence certain. of the files in case numbered
2888 and in which John A. Malia, as State Bank Commissioner, is plaintiff and. Richard H. Spencer; John
Edison Spencer, Robert D. 'Tibbs, Elizabeth A. Tibbs
and others are defendants. Later in the proceedings
all of the files in that case were received in evidence.
(Tr. 73 to 80 and 576-583)
The files in 2888 civil contain the proceedings had
in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings by the Bank
Commissioner through which foreclosure proceedings
the plaintiff in this case, as we. understand his position,
claims his title to 60 acres or shares of water. We
shall not attempt to set out the various documents
found in that case but shall content ourselves with
referring to such of such documents as we deem material
to this case. The files are marked : ''John Edison
Spencer Exhibit 14," but most of the documents therein
contained were first offered by the plaintiff and over
objection~ received in evidence as above indicated.

1:
I'

It will be seen from the files in said case numbered
2888 ci.vil that. the action was first brought to set aside
certain deeds. After issues were made by the complaint
and answers thereto an amended complaint ~as filed
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in which numerous additional parties were 1nade defendants and the plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on both real and personal property.
In our view_ the only part of the proceedings had
in that case which are material here are those portion
thereof which relates to the foreclosure of d1e mortgage
executed by H. ~I. Spencer, Ida Spencer, R. Leo Spencer,
Grace Spencer, R. H. Spencer, Leo Harold Spencer and
Fern Spencer. A copy of that mortgage will be found
marked Exhibit •'G'' and made a part of the amended
complaint. As heretofore indicated that mortgage covers
the West Half of the Northeast Quarter, the Southeast
Quarter of the the Northwest Quarter and the North
Half of the South Half of Section Three (3), Township
12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
containing 280 acres, subject to right of way of county
road.
Together with all rights of every kind and nature,
however evidenced to the :use of water, ditches and
canals for the irrigation of said premises to which the
mortgagors or said premises are now or may hereafter
become entitled whether represented by certificates of
stock or otherwise and together with sixty shares or
acres of water right owned by R. H. Spencer in the
waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle Creek and Rock
Creek in addition to waters now us·ed for the irrigation
of the above described lands.
To the complaint of the Bank Commissioner
Richard H. Spencer, Annie H. Spencer1 John Edison
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Spencer, Elizabeth A. Tibbs, et al, filed a general demurrer and an answer. In the answer they denied most
of the allegations of the complaint. ·
To the complaint filed by John A. Malia, as Bank
Commissioner, the Indiano1a Irrigation Company filed
an answer and cross complaint. In its answer it admitted mosf of the allegations of the complaint and in its
cross complaint it sought to enjoin the transfer of the
certificates of stock held by the other parties to the aetion.
Simon Hugentobler also filed an answer, counterclaim and cross complaint in the action. In his counterclaim and cross complaint he sought to foreclose a
mortgage given to him on January 3, 1922 by Richard Leo
Spencer, Grace Spencer, R. H. Spencer and Annie H.
Spencer as security for a nate in the sum of $2,577.91.
The mortgage which he sought to foreclose was on Lot 4
of Section 5 and Lot 1 of Section 6 in Township 12 South,
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian and 55 acres of
Primary Water Right from the waters of ·Thistle Creek.
There are numerous other pleadings in cause 2888
civil but no useful purpose will be served by directing
the attention of the court thereto in this proceeding.
It appears f~om the reCitals preceding the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law that a trail was had
before the court sitting without a jury. That the plaintiff and defendants Richard H. Spencer, Annie Spencer,
cross complainants >Simon Hugentobler and Indianola
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Irrigation Company were represented by counsel; that
John Edison Spencer was present in eourt butt not
represented by counsel and that the other parties to the
action had been given notice of the tin1e set for the
trail.
The findings of fact are in the usual forn1 in a
mortgage foreclosure. In paragraph 12 on page 5 of
the findings the court finds that the mortgage to the
Bank Commissioner was executed. In its findings numbered 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 the court found:
21
''That the Indianola Irrigation Company, a
corporation claims to be the owner of the water
rights described in plaintiff's mortgage by virtue
of a deed of conveyance executed and delivered to
said company the 25 day of November, 1931, by the
defendants Richard H. Spencer and Annie H.
Spencer, his wife. That on said 25 day of N ovember, 1931, the said defendants Richard H. Spencer
and Annie H. Spencer, his wife, ~executed and
delivered to said Irrigation Company a deed
conveying and transferring to said company 160
shares of decreed water rights then owned by the
said Richard H. Spencer in the waters of Clear
Creek, Thistle Creek and Rock Creek. That said
160 shares of decreed water rights included the
60 shares of water rights de'Scribed in plaintiff's
mortgage hereinabove referred to, which mortgage was executed and delivered the 16th day of
October, 1931."
22
''That said Indianola Irrigation Company
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accepted conveyance of said water rights subsequent to the recordation of plaintiff's mortgage which was recorded upon the records of
Sanpete County, Utah, the 21 day of ·October,
1931, and said Irrigation Company is charged
with notice of plaintiff's mortgage. That the
rights acquired by the said Irrigation Company
by virtue of said conveyance from Richard H.
Spencer and wife are subsequent, subject, subordinate and inferior to the rights of the plaintiff
under the plaintiff's mortgage hereinabove mentioned.''
23
"That on said 25 day of November, 1931,
the said Richard H. Spencer received from said
Irrigation Company in exchange for the conveyance aforesaid, certificate of stock No. 57
of said company for 160 shares of class ''A''
stoek of said Irrigation Company, which certificate was issued in the name of State of Utah
as pledges of R. H. Spencer. That said defendant
Richard H. Spencer and Annie H. Spencer, at
the said time and place represented and warranted to the officers of said Irrigation Company that the 160 shares of water deeded to said
company on said day were free and dear of all
enclflmhrances -and that the title of said defendant
Richard H. Spencer ifuereto was good and valid
and that :said defendant Richa;rd H. Spencer
was entitled to ·said 160 shares of -corporate stock
in said ~corporation; that said 'irrigation company
then and there relied upon said statements and
representations of said defendant and in reliance upon said statements and representations
the said company· issued its stock certificate No.
·57 aforesaid."'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
24
''That on or about the 30 day of December,
1933, the defendant Richard H. Spencer surrendered and endorsed to said Indianola Irrigation Company the said . certificate of stock No.
57 above mentioned, and upon this request and
representation that he was ·the owner of the
stock and water rights represented thereby there
was issued ·to and received by him two certificates in exchange th~refor, to-wit: Certificate
No. 72 for eighty ·shares issued in the name of
"The Federal Land Bank of Berkeley as agent
of the Land Bank Commissioner, pledgee of
John E. Spencer." That said certificates Nos.
72 and 73 are now outstanding an9. are now in
possession of the defendant Richard H. Spencer.''

25
''That the defendants Richard H. Spencer
and John :Edison Spencer, claim, by virtue of said
stock certificates No. 72 and 73 aforesaid, and
otherwise, to be the owners ·of the water rights
represented by the said certificates. That said
claims are in each. case subsequent, subject, subordinate, and inferior to ·the rights of the plaintiff under his mortgage as aforesaid."
26

"That said defendants Richard H. ·Spencer
and John Edison Spencer will probably attempt
to transfer the said shares of stock represented
. by sa:id certificates herein Teferred to unless
restrained hy the court and "in ease of such transfer the said Indianola Irrigation Company will
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·probably suffer irreparable injury for which said
company has no adequate remedy at law.''
In its findings the court also found that the mortgage to Simon Hugentobler had been executed.
In its conclusions of law the court ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Bank Commissioner, and
Simon Hugentobler.
As one of its seventeen conclusions the trail court
in said cause No. 2888 civil says :
'' * * * and that plaintiff has a valid and subsist·ing first mortgage lien, as against each and all of
the other parties to this action, upon aH of the
real estate and water rights described in plaintiff's real estate mortgage hereinabove referred
to, to secure payment of all the respective amounts
owing upon said notes as above set forth, including interest and attorney fees and costs of
this action.''

''That whatever rights, if any, the defendants
and cross complainants herein may assert in,
to or upon the real estate and water rights described in plaintiff's real estate mortgage aforesaid, such rights and claims are in the case of
each and every defendant and cross complainant
subsequent, subordinate, inferior and subject to
the lien of. plaintiff's mortgage."
In its Decree of Foreclosure the court among other
things determined, ordered, adjudged and decreed: That
plaintiff's mortgage be enforced and foreclosed and the
real estate and water rights described therein and that
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the n1ortgage of Sin1on Hugentobler be forec~osed and
sold to satisfy the judgment in favor -of Hugentobler.
Paragraph 1-:1 of the decree of foreclosure reads
thus:
"That the defendants Richard H. Spencer,
Annie -H. Spencer, John Edison Spencer, Robert
D. Tibbs and Elizabeth A. Tibbs be and are hereby restrained and enjoined from in any way assigning, transferring, disposing of or encumbering certificates of stock No. 72 and No. 73, issued by the Indianola Irrigation Company, or
the water rights represented by said _certificates,
or any other water rights held or claimed by said
defendants -in the waters of Thistle Creek, Clear
Creek or Rock Creek until the further order of
this court. The Court hereby retains jurisdiction
of this cause for further hearing upon the rights
asserted by the Indianola Irrigation Company
against said defendants."
The findings of fact, conclusion~ of law and decree
were signed on December 3, 1936 and filed the following
day.
On the same day that the decree of foreclosure was
filed the sheriff published notice of sale. Such notice
describes the land covered by the mortgage and water
in the exact language of the mortgage.
So also in the sheriff's return and the order of sale
the real and personal property is described in the
exact language of. the mortgage made to the Bank Commissioner. (Note the files in· 2888 civil being made as
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exhibits are not numbered consecutively but the papers
therein are arranged in the order in which they were
filed).
The Bank Commissioner's deed to the plaintiff,
James C. Whittaker, describes the wa;ter right claimed
by him in the following language :
"The right to the use of 60 acres of primary
water right, being 60 acres ot shares of class
''A'' right, from Thistle Creek and its tributaries in Sanpete County, State of Utah to be
used for irrigation, culinary and stock watering
purposes, during the irrigation season from April
1st to October 1st of each year upon lands in
Township 12 8outh, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Meridian, being ~the same 60 ·acres ·of primary or
60 shares of class ''A'' water right :of the 448
acres or shares of primary or class ''A'' water
right ·decreed to Richard H. Spencer by the
decree of the district court in and for Sanpete
County, State of Utah in case No. 1406." See
Tr. 97.
The proceedings had in the .mortgage foreclosure
of the State Bank Commissioner against the Spencers
will also be found in an abstract which was received
ln evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit ''M''.
The mortgage given by the Spencers to the Federal
Building and Loan Association on the land and water
right heretofore mentioned was foreclosed. At the .foreelosure proceedings the Association bought.in the mort.gaged property. Thereafter the AssociaJtion conveyed
the water right to the Indianola Irrigation Company.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23

(See Indiano:Ja Irr. Co. Exhibit 2) It received two certificates of stock the same being represented by certificate of stock No. 84 for 125 shares of class "A"
8tock which was received in evidence as Indianola Irrigation Company's Exhibit 20A. It will be noted that
the certificate was assigned to Richard H. Spencer.
The remainder of the 285 shares acquired by the
Federal Building and Loan Association is numbered 86
of the Indianola Irrigation Company for 160 shares of
class "A" water stock 'issued to the Federal Land
Bank of Berkeley as pledgee of Robert D. Tibbs. Tha·t
exhibit was received in evidence as Exhibit 11. That is
the 160 shares of stock that was awarded to the appellant
John Edison Spencer.
The land that was foreclosed by the Federa~ Building and Loan Association was also reconveyed to Richard
H. Spencer. ( Tr. 884, 887 and 889).
Under date of August 7, 1945 R.. H. 'Spencer ex'ecuted a deed to the Southeast Quarter of Section 8, Township 12 South, R.ange 4 EaS't, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres. (See John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 5.)
This is a part of the prnperty that was mortgaged 'to and
foreclosed by the Federal Building and Loan Association.
On the same day R. H. S.penoor executed a warranty ideed
to Elizabeth A. Tibbs to the Southwest Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter of Section 5, Township 12 South,
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 40 acres,
more or less. (See John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 7.)
T.hls too is a part of the property mortgaged to and
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foreclosed by the Federal Building and Loan Association.
Theretofore R. H~ Spencer had executed a deed to
Elizabeth A. Tibbs conveying the Southeast Quarter of
the Northwest Quarter of Section '5, Township 12 South,
Range 4 East of the .Salt Lake Base and Meridian. (See
John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 8.)
On August 7, 1945, R. H. Spencer also executed a
deed to 53.78 acres of land. in said Section, township and
range. (See John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 6.)
This tract of land is a:lso a part of the land mortgaged to and foreclosed by the Federal Building and
Loan Association.
The deeds from R. H. Spencer, sometimes known as
Richard H. Spencer, which were executed on August 7,
1945 before C. H. Beal, an abstractor of Manti were delivered to the grantees on May 31, 1946. (See testimony
of R. D. Tibbs, Louise Spencer and C. H. Beal. Tr. 819
to 878.)
The wa1.er represented by all of the certificates of
stock have at all times been used on the Hugentobler land
and the land which Richard H. Spencer conveye~ to
John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs. (See testimony of Lyman Seeley. Tr. 360 to 365 and testimony of
John Edison Spencer, Tr. ·502 to 511, and Tr. 600 to 635.)
There is no evidence to the contrary.
The court may be aided in following the evidence
as to the 1land upon which 1the water in question was at
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all tin1es used by referring to Indianola Irrigation Company's Exhibit 29.
'Ine trial court awarded to appellant John Edison
Spencer 3 acres of water for which no certificate had
been issued as being appurtenant to the land conveyed
to John Edison Spencer by R. H. Spencer, also known
as Richard H. Spencer, under date of August 7, 1945.
(See Tr. 58± to 586.) So far as appears no certificate was
ever issued for the water that was used on the land
covered by the mortgage to Simon Hugentobler unless it
was represented by certificate 84 for 125 shares of water.
We have thus far at some length directed the attention of the court to transactions had touching the title
to the land upon which the water in dispute was used rut
all times prior to the death of Richard H. Spencer and
up to the time of the trial of this cause. We have done so
because, as we contend, the water right was at alfl times
appurtenant to the land upon which the water was used
notwithstanding the water right may have been represented by certificate of stock. In this connection an examination of the testimony will reveal that at all times .
prior to the time R. H. Spencer delivered the deeds to
John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs the certificates of stock and the land upon which the water was
used were owned by the same person.
In the event the court should conclude that the water
in dispute is appurtenant ~to the land upon which it was
used that would probably end this controversy, except
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possibly as to the 60 acres or shares elaimed by the
plal.ntiff.

;~

If the court shoUld not so conclu~e it will: probably
be necessary to look into the evidence touching the various transfers of the stock certificates.
Certificate numbered 86 for the 160 shares of water
is marked John Edison Spencer's, et al, Exhibit 11 and
as such was received in evidence. It is made out to The
Federal Land Bank of Berkeley as pledgee of Robert
D. Tibbs. On the hack of that certificate is a release
of a lien by the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley, pledgee.
That certificate comes out of the certificate for 285
shares evidenced by certificate 81 issued to the Federal
Building and Loan Association. (See photostatic copy
of the exhibit of Indianola Irrigation Co.) The number
of the exhibit does not appear on the same. That
certificate was surrendered and certificates number 84
and 86 issued in lieu ~the~eof. Certificate 86 is for the
l60 Class "A" stock which is marked: "John Edis?n
Spencer's, et al, Exhibit 11.) Oertificate 84 is for 125
shares Class ''A'' stock and is marked ''Indianola Irrigation Company's Exhibit 20A". Certificate numbered
86 for 160 shares was acquired by John Edison Spencer
assuming and paying the obligation owing upon the certifieate and the land u[>on which it was used to the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley. (See evidence of John
Edison Spencer beginning at page 476 to 489 of the
transcript and John Edison Spencer's Exhibits 3, 4, 4a.)
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As to certificate 84 for 125 shares, n1arked. Indianola Irrigation Company's Exhibit 20A, the evidence is
that it was part of the water right mortgaged to 1he Federal Building and Loan Association; that after the mortgage was foreclosed the Federal Building and Loan Association conveyed all of the water right it acquired to
the Indianola Irrigation Company and received in return therefor a certificate of stock for 285 shares of
which 223 acres or shares were the waters owned by
R. H. SP,encer and the balance of 62 or 62¥2 acres or
shares were owned by his children who signed the mortgage to the Federal Building and Loan Ass0ciation. The
certificate for 125 of the 285 shares was made out and
delivered to R. H. Spencer. It will he noted that R. H.
Spencer received something like 62 or 63 shares more
when he purchased the ~and and water back from the
Federal Building and Loan Association than he had
when he made the mortgage to the Federal Building
I
and Loan Association. There is evidence that the Rugen- '
tobler water was in that certificate. Mr. Pederson, a witness called by the administrator of the estate of R. H.
Spencer testified that the Hugentohler water came out
of the water claimed hy the Federal Building and Loan
Association and not out of certificates 72 or 73. ( Tr. 241.) ·
.Mrs. Louise Spencer, the wife of John Edison Spencer, testified that on May 30, 1946 when. the de:eds were
delivered to John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs
that Mrs. Tibbs mentioned that the deeds did not mention any water and that Daddy (R. H. Spencer) told
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

her that when the litigation was finished and the water
was clear she would get water for her ground. That
Mr. Spencer also mentioned that water wolrld go with
the other land. On cross :examination she testified that
he gave Edison certificate 84 and told him that was to
be his and have it transferred. (Tr. 852-854.) On crosss
examination an attempt was made to impeach Mrs. Spencer by calling her attention to her testimony given at
the time an administrator was appointed. Such testimony will be found on pages 856 to 864. At the former
hearing Mrs. Spencer did not testify about the delivery
of the water certificate but it will be noted that the subject matter of inquiry on the former hearing was the
deeds which Mr. Spencer delivered to John Edison
Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs, which deeds had been
brought in a sealed envelope from the o·ffice of Mr. Beal
at Manti.

I

John Edison Spencer testified that the certificate
for 125 shares was given to him along with the deed to
a tract of land (deed which is known as the waupitz
land). That he went and ta~ked to the secretary of the
Indianola Irrigation Company and he said he c?uldn't
transfer it to me, that thereafter he took it to the Feder~ Building and Loan Association to see if there was
an assignment from his father to him. (Tr. 626.) It
should be noted that the foregoing testimony of John
Edison Spencer was objected to because the witness was
incompetent to testify. The objection was overruled becaus,e the administrator had waived the objection by inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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quiring into what the witness had testified to on a prior
hearing. (See Tr. 466 and 467 and administrator's, Exhibit 1±.)
As to certificate numbered 72 the evidence shows
that it came out of certificate 57. (See photostatic copy
marked Indianola Irrigation Company's Exhibit 9.) That
certificate No. 72 is dated December 30, 1933 and made
out to Richard H. Spencer, Pledgee Federal Land Bank
of Berkeley. It was so made out because Richard H.
Spencer intended to secure a loan from that Bank, but
the loan failed. That certificate was assigned to I. M.
Price, Richard H. Spencer having signed his name to
the same with the words "as part of security named in
mortgage.'' The evidence shows that I. M. Price attempted to foreclose a mortgage on that certificate, together with certificate No. 72 and 160 acres of land.
(See John Edison Spencer's, et al, Exhibit 9, the same
being the official files of the district court of Utah
County.) It will be noted that the land therein described is in Sections 5 in Sanpete County and· parts of
sections_ 33 and 34 in Township 11 South of Range 4
East of Salt Lake Meridian. !The reporter has copied
all of the files in the transcript at pages 514 to 566.
There is also in evidence a certified copy of the mortgage which was sought to be foreclosed. It will be noted
that the mortgage is dated February 27, 1932 and was
acknowledged the same day.
It will be observed that with the land in Sanpe'te
County there is included 160 acres of water right. It
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wil!l also be observed that the sheriff attempted to sell
the 160 acres of water used on Section 5, Township 12
South of Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian. The attempt was made by both the sheriff of Utah County and
Sanpete County. In the certificate of the sheriff of
Sanpete County dated February 4, 1937 certificates 72
and 73 are specifically mentioned. (See John Edison
Spencer's, et al, Exhibit 10.) So far as appears no
sheriff's deed to the land or bill of sale to the water were
ever executed by the sheriff.
In light of what occurred at the trial we shall not
devote any time to a discussion of the mortgage forecloure proceedings. We direct the attention of the court
to Administrator's Exhibits 12 and 16.
Early in the trial counsel for Whittaker and counsel for the administrator and counse:l for the Indianola
Irrigation Company demanded that counsel who appear-·
ed by the record to represent Mr. Price show their authority to do so. (See Tr. pages 10-58-59. Thereupon
John Edison Spencer was sworn and testified touching
that matter. (See Tr. 59.) Mr. L. Leland Larson also testified about our authority to act for Mr. Price. (Tr. 8385.) It will be noted :that the trial of the cause began on
June 23, 1947. The ·evidence above referred to was given
on June 23 and 24. Later in the trial administrator's exhibit 12 was received in evidence. It will be noted that
I
such ·exhibit is dated July 14, 1947. It will also be noted
that administrator's exhibit 16 characterized as a deposition is dated the 1st day of March, 1947, several
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months before the case came on for trial. No claim
is made that counsel for Mr. Price, if he had one,
or counsel for John Edison Spencer or Elizabeth A.
Tibbs eYer had any notice that a deposition was to
be taken. It necessarily follows that to characterize
the administrator's Exhibit 16 a deposition is a
a misnomer. However, the contents of that exhibit shows
that Mr. Price disclaimed any right, title or interest in
or to certificates 72 and 73. He states that he returned
it to R. H. Spencer in 1934. "I paid $600 for it ***
I do not claim any interest in it now. It was for a loan.
I do not owe anything toR. H. Spencer's estate. It does
not owe me anything. I transferred the title to the water
stock, Nos. 72 and 73 and bench property and W ansit
Farm back to R. H. Spencer in the fall of 1941. ''
In this connection with the deal between Price and
R. H. Spencer touching the two certificates 72 and 73
is the testimony of John Henry Peterson. (Tr. 446.)
The court will have a difficult task to reconcile
the foregoing statements of I. M. Price with the mortgage foreclosure proceedings had in Utah County to
which reference has heretofore been made.
The position of counsel who thought they were representing Mr. Price was expressed by them at the trial.
(See Tr~ 497-498, and 920 and 926.) It will be noted that
administrator's Exhibit 16 was received in evidence over
the objection of counsel for John Edison Spencer and
Mrs. Tibbs. (Tr. 918.)
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We have not changed our mind in such particular.
We shall not burden the court with an analysis of the
transaction had between I. M. Price and R. H. Spencer
touching certificates 72 and 73 because no ;matter what
view is taken of the evidence the results will be the
same, namely : that Price had a lien on the two certificates
as security for a loan. That when the loan was paid off
the certificates reverted to the persons who owned them
before the loan was made.
The evidence touching the ownership of certificate
No. 72 independent of the question of whether or not
the same is appurtenant to the land upon which it was
used consist of the following:
Louise Spencer testified that on May 30, 1946 when
the deeds were delivered R. H. 'Spencer stated that:
"when the litigation was finished and the water was
clear she (Mrs. Tibbs), would get water for her ground.
( Tr. 852.) Edison Spencer testified that according to
an arrangement had with Price and his father he, Edison,
was to pay to the daughter of Price the sum of $1000,00
and certificate numbered 72 was to be given to Mrs.
Tibbs. (Tr. 608 and 640.)
Counsel for the administrator cross examined John
Edison Spencer at.considerable length. (Tr. 738 to 749.)
Apparently counsel for the administrator deemed it of
considerable importance because Mr. gpencer at such
fo~mer hearings testified that he claimed only 5 shares
of water right. The fact was that at that time, as shown
by the evidence in this case, Mr. John Edison Spencer
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did not, so far as he knew, have a record title on the

books of the con1pany to the water in dispute.
In the warranty deed dated l\Iay 31st, 1931 Richard
H. Spencer and Annie Spencer, his wife, conveyed "40
acres of land and 20 acres of water" to Elizabeth A.
Tibbs. ( Tr. 35 and 36.)

R. D. Tibbs, the husband of Elizabeth A. Tibbs,
testified that lie ( R. H. Spencer) told Edison and Mrs.
Tibbs that water went with the land that he conveyed to
:Jirs. Tibbs. ( Tr. 824.) That on another occasion when
the first deed was givn to Mrs. Tibbs in 1943, he, R. H.
Spencer, was to get water for the land conveyed to her
as soon as the litigation was finished. (Tr. 828.)
Independent of any question of appurtenancy the
evidence bearing on the ownership of certificate No. 73
shows : That certificate is made out to the Federal Land

Bank of Berkeley as agent of the Land Bank Commissioner, pledgee of John E. Spencer. On the hack of the
certificate it is assigned to I. M. Price by John E. Spencer, as s·ecurity for loan to R. H. Spencer as per mortgage.
The warranty deed of Richard H. Spencer and Annie H. Spencer, his wife, to John E. Spencer conveys to
John E. Spencer: The North One Half of the Southwest
Quarter of Sec. 5, Township 12 South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Meridian.
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"Together with 80 acres of water in what is known
as Thistle Creek''. (See John Eidson Spencer, et al, Exhibit 12.)
At the time of the death of R. H. Spencer and for
some time prior thereto certificates numbered 72 and
73 were in the possession of the firm of attorneys, Larson and Larson, until they were turned over to his present counsel. (Tr. 615 and 670-671 and 717-718.)
We have directed the attention of the court to the
evidence in this case at greater length and in more detail
than usual in the statement of the case. We have done
so because there are so many exhibits brought up with
the record, a number of which were no~ received in evidence, and the evidence presented in the transcript is
so long that we have deemed it necessary to direct the
attention of the court to where the evidence which we
deem of importance may be found in the transcript. We
hope that we have succeeded in directing the attention
~f the court to those portions of the evidence which are
of controlling ~portance, if not doubtless opposing
cormsel will finish the undertaking.

·ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The defandants and appellants John Edison Spencer
and Elizabeth A. Tibbs jointly and severally make the
following assignments of error upon which they rely
for a r.eversal of the judgment appealed from and for
an order of this court directing the court below to make
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findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment as
prayed for by them in their pleadings:
1. The trial court erred in making that part of its
findings wherein it is found that during the trial it was
made to appear that such appearance and pleadings (for
Irwin M. Price) had not been authorized by him; for
the reason that such findings is without support in the
evidence and is contrary to the clear preponderance
thereof. (J. R. 249.)

2. The trial court erred in holding that the trial
was had on a disclaimer of John Edison Spencer because
there was no disclaimer by John Edison Spencer to the
water right involved in this controversy. '(J. R. 250.)
3. The trial court erred in that part of its finding
numbered 7 wherein it found that Richard H. Spencer
mortgaged to the Federal ,Building and Loan Association, a corporation, 285 shares or acres of his said 448
acres of primary or class ''A'' water right, that such
finding is without support in the evidence which affirmatively shows that Richard H. Spencer mortgaged
only 223 acres or shares of water right to the Federal
Building and Loan Association. (J. R. 256.)
4. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding nwnbered 7 wherein it found that he, Richard
H. Spencer, mortgaged 60 shares or acres of his said
448 acres of primary or class ''A'' water right to M. H.
Hadlock for the use and benefit of the creditors of the
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port in the evidence in that the mortgage is so ambiguous and uncertain as to be null and void. ( J. R. 256.)
5. The trial court erred in making that part of
its finding numbered 7 wherein it is found that on November 25, 1931 Richard H. Spencer conveyed to the
Indianola Irrigation Company by deed 160 shares or
acres of his said 448 shares or acres of primary water
right. That the evidence and the preponderance thereof
shows that such conveyance was made on June 1st, 1918,
and the evidence shows that such deed was and is so
uncertain and ambiguous as to render it null and void.
(J. R. 256.)
6. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 7 wherein it found that: ''the said
-conveyance of 160 acres of water right made by said
Richard H. Spencer to the Indianola Irrigation Company includes the 55 acres which he had previously mortgaged to Simon Hugentobler." That such finding is
wholly without support in the evidence and is contrary
to the evidence and the preponderance thereof. (J. R.
256.).
7. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 7 wherein it found in effect that the
160 acres of water conveyed to the Indianola Irrigation
Company incluq.ed the 60 acres which, he, Richard
H. Spencer, had previously mortgaged to W. H. Hadlock. That such findi~g is without support in the evidence a~d is contrary to the preponderance thereof.
(J. R. 2'56.)
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8. The trial court erred in Inaking that part of its
finding nunnbered 8 wherein it is in effect found that
Richard H. Spencer mortgaged to the Federa!l Building
and Loan Association 285 acres of water. That such
finding is without support in the evidence and is contrary thereto and the clear preponderance thereof. (J. R.
256.)
9. The trial court erred by in effect finding in its
finding numbered 9 that in the case numbered 2888 civil
a valid foreclosure proceeding was had and a valid sheriff's deed was given conveying 60 acres or shares of
water to Rulon F. Starly, State Bank Commissioner of
the State of Utah. That such findings are without sup-port in the evidence and on the contrary the evidence
shows that such proceedings were so ambiguous and
uncertain as to render the same null and void. ( J. R.
257.)
10. The trial court erred in making that part of
its finding numbered 10 wherein it found that on May 22,
1939 Rulon F. Starly, State Bank Commissioner of the
State of Utah was the owner, for the use and benefit of
the creditors of North Sanpete Bank, of the right to the
use of said 60 acres of primary water right or 60 shares
of class ''A'' water right. That such finding is without
support in the evidence and is contrary thereto in that
the pretended mortgage sought to be foreclosed, the
notice of the pretended sale and the pretended sheriff's
deed are so uncertain and ambiguous as to render such
documents and proceedings null and void. (J. R. 258.)
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11. The trial court erred in making that part of
its finding numbered 10 wherein it found that the Bank
Commissioner of Utah conveyed to this plaintiff 60 acres
of primary water right or 60 shares of class ''A'' water
right, the same being a part of the 448 shares of primary
or class ''A'' water so decreed to said Richard H. Spencer, in case No. 1406.;That such findings is without support. in the evidence and is contrary thereto in that the
pretended conveyance is so uncertain and ambiguous as
to render the same nu!ll and void and no title passed to
the plaintiff thereby. ( J.R.2'58)
12. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 10 wherein it found that the plaintiff
became and he has ever since been and now is the owner
in fee simple of the right to the use of 60 ac;res of primary
water right or 60 shares of class "A" water right of the
waters of Thistle Creek and its tributaries for the irrigation of 60 acres of land in Section 3, Township 12
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian, in Sanpete
County, State of Utah; that said 60 acres so owned by
this plaintiff are a part of the 1728 acres of primary or
class ''A'' rights mentioned and described in the decree
in case No. 1406 aforesaid and a part of the 448 acres of
primary water right or shares of class ''A'' rights decreed to said Richard H. Spencer in case No. 1406. That
such finding is without support in the findings but is contrary thereto for the reason that the conveyance under
which plaintiff claims title is so vague, uncertain and ambiguous as to be null and void. (J.R. 259.)
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13. The court erred in 1naking its finding numbered
11 and the whole thereof and particularly to that part of
finding numbered 11 wherein it is found that Richard H.
Spencer conveyed 285 acres of water to the Federal
Building and Loan Association and that portion of said
finding that there are 115 shares of class ''A'' stock of
said corporation outstanding for which said corporation
has no water stock. (J.R. 259)
1-1. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 15 wherein it found that plaintiff,
James C. \Vhittaker, now is and ever since the 22nd day
of ~fay, 1939 has been the owner and entitled to the use
and enjoyment and ever since the 9th day of December,
1937 ...he and his predecessors have been the owners and
entitled to the use and enjoyment of 60 acres or shares
of primary or class ''A'' water right in the waters of
Thistle Creek and its. tributaries, the same being a part
of the 448 acres or shares of primary or Class ''A'' water
right so decreed to Richard H. Spencer by the decree
made and entered on May 6, 19·20 in case No. 1406. 'That
such part of finding numbered 16 is without support in
the evidence and is contrary to the preponderance thereof. That the evidence and the preponderance thereof
fails to show that Whittaker has title to such water right.
(J.R. 260)
15. ~he court erred in finding in its finding numbered 17 that the plaintiff's title to 60 shares or acres
of water right inclu'ded and that its vail.ue has been hnpaired ·or

le~sened

for the reason that plaintiff has no
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title to the water right claimed by him. That such part
of finding numbered 17 is without support in the evidence
and is contrary to the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 260.)
16. The trial court erred in making those parts of
its finding numbered 17 wherein it in effe-ct found that
all of the claims of the defendants, except that of Que
Jensen and the State of Utah, are subsequent and subordinate to the right and title of the plaintiff therein
and are. void, and that none of the defendants to this
action has any right, title or interest in or to the said 60
acres of primary or class ''A'' water rights or part thereof. That such findings are without support in the evidence and the same are contrary to the evidence and the
preponderance thereof. (J.R. 261)

l.

17. The ·trial court erred in making its finding
numbe-red 18 because such finding is without support in
the evidence and the same is contrary to the evidence
and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 262)
18. The trial court erred in making that part of finding numbered 19 wherein it found that the 55 shares of
water right mortgaged to Simon Hugentobler and the
60 shares of water right mortgaged to the State Bank
Commissioner-are part of the water right represented
- by said certificates numbered 72 and 73 aforesaid and
particularly did the court err in making such finding as
it might affect the rights of the plaintiff and Simon Hugentobler because such finding is without any issue raised
by Simon Hugentobler and/or the plaintiff as neither of
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tlwm1nade any such claim in the proeeeding had to foreclose their respectiYe nwrtgag·es. That such finding i::-~
without support in the ~vidence in this case and is contrary to the same and the preponderance thereof, and
:mch finding is not ''ithin any issue raised by said plaintiff or by the successor in interest of Simon Hugentobler
in the present action, and is at variance with the pleadings of each of the above n1entioned parties to this action.
(J.R. 261 and 262.)
19. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 20 which in effect found that the claim
of Irwin ~I. Price to a lien on certificates numbered 72
and 73 was subsequent to the decree of foreclosure entered in case numbered 2888 civil for the reason that the
claim of Irwin ~I. Price originated on February 27, 1932
(See exhibit 13 of John Edison Spencer, et al) and as
found by this court in its finding numbered 9 was entered
on December 4, 1936. That such finding is without support in the evidence and the same is contrary to the evidence and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 262)

20. That the trial court erred in making that part
of its finding numbered 20 wherein it found that said
certificates numbered 72 and 73 were returned to the
possession of Richard H. Spencer for the reason that
such finding is without support in the ·evidence and is
contrary thereto and to the preponderance thereof. (J.R.
262)
21. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 20 wherein it found that at the time of
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his death Richard H. Spencer was the owner and in possession of said certificates and each of them and that
Richard Leo Spencer, as administrator of the estate of
Richard H. Spencer, deceased, is now entitled to 45
shares of the class ''A'' stock of the Indianola Irrigation
Company represented by certificates 72 and 73 after said
certificates shall have been surrendered to the Indianol~
Irrigation Company and cancelled and a new certificate
for 45 shares of said class ''A'' stock shall he issued in
lieu thereof. That such finding is without support in the
evl.dence and is contrary to the evidence and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 262)
22. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 20 wherein it found: ''that the water
right represented by certificate No. 72 is not appurtenant
to the South Half o~ the Northwest Quarter of Section 5,
Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian in Sanpete County, Utah, claimed to be owned
by Elizabeth A. Tibbs. That such finding is without sup~
port in the evidence and is contrary to the evidence and
the preponderance thereof. ( J.R. 262)
23. The trial court erred in making that part of
finding numbered 21 wherein it found that prior to the
death of Richard H. Spencer he did not c~use to be conveyed and transferred to John Edison Spencer the water
right represented by ·certificates numbered 73 and numbered 84 in the Indianola Irrigation Company. That such
finding is without support in the evidence and the same
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is contrary to the evidence and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 262)
24. The trial court erred in making its finding numbered 22 and the whole thereof. That such finding is without support in the evidence and is contrary to the evidence and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 263)
25. The trial court erred in making its finding
numbered 23 and the whole thereof. That such finding is
without support in the evidence and the preponderance
thereof. ( J .R. 263-4)
26. The trial court erred in making its finding
numbered 24 and the whole and each part thereof. That
such finding is without support in the evidence and is
contrary thereto and the preponderance thereof. (J.R.
264)
27. The t:rjal court erred in making its finding
numbered 25 and the-whole thereof. That such finding is
without support in the evidence and is contrary thereto
and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 264)
28. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 26 wherein it found that the deed
which was made and executed by Richard H. Spencer
and his wife as grantors to the Indianola Irrigation
Company as grantee * * * is not null or void and is of
full force and effect, that said deed * * * was actually
signed and executed by Richard H. Spencer and his wife
on November 25, 1931, and was never acknowledged by
Richard H. Spencer or his wif~. 'That the above quoted
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parts of finding numbered 26 are without support in the
evidence and the same are contrary thereto and the clear
preponderance thereof.
29. The trial court erred in making its finding
numbered 27 and the whole and each part thereof. That
such finding is without support in the evidence and is
contrary thereto and the preponderance thereof. (J.R.
265.)

,\

30. The tria[ court erred in its construction of
what was alleged and what was found and what was
adjudged in case numbered 288~ civil. That the court in
said case numbered 2888 made its findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree as recited in such findings,
concluRions and decree and not otherwise.
3L The. trial court erred in its finding numbered
28 wherein it found that the trial court in 2888 civil
found that the water rights involved in this action were
subsequ'ent and that the rights claimed by Joh~ Edison
Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs were inferior to the
rights of the plaintiff, that such rights were sold at public auction to the plaintiff. That such findings are without support in the evidence and are contrary thereto and
the preponderance thereof. ( J.R. 266.)

'il

32. The trial court erred in that part of its finding
numbered 28 wherein it found that the water rights
involved in this action were sold and conveyed to the
plain tiff herein and that the plain tiff herein has been
and now is the owner of such water rights. That such
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finding is without support in the evidence and is contrary
thereto and the preponderance thereof. ( J .R. 266)
33. The trial court erred in its finding numbered
28 wherein it is found that Richard H. Spencer has filed
his verified disclaimer in and to the water rights involved in this action. The trial court likewise erred in its
, finding nun1bered 28 wherein it found that John Edison
Spencer has filed ~is disclaimer to any of the water
rights involved in this action. That such finding is. without support in the evidence and is. contrary thereto and
the preponderance thereof. More particularly the water
rights which were disclaimed by Richard H. Spencer and
John Edison Spencer and described in plaintiff's complaint and parti~ularly paragraph XIV thereof were
''the right to the use of 60 acres of primary rights or 60
shares of cJlass ''A'' water rights of the waters of Thistle
Creek and its tributaries for the irrigation of 60 acres of
land in Section 3, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt
Lake :Meridian, in Sanpete County. That the water rights
here involved were never used on any land in Section 3
above described. (See record 8) (J.R. 266)
34. The trial court erred in making that part of
its finding numbered 28 wherein it found that the disclaimer of Richard H. Spencer has never been withdrawn,
modified or questioned in this action and is still binding
upon him and all persons, including John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs, and likewise erred in finding
that the alleged disclaimer of John Edison Spencer has
never been withdrawn, dismissed, set aside, modified,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

46

annuled or repudiated by him and is sti~l binding upon
him. That such findings and each of them is without
support in the evidence and is contrary thereto and the
preponderance thereof. And more particularly the trial
court permitted both the administrator of the estate of
Richard H. Spencer and John Edison $pencer to file an·
answer to the merits of plaintiff's complaint. and the
case was tried on the issues raised by plaintiff's complaint and the answers thereto of the administrator of
the estate of Richard H. Spencer and John Edison. Spencer. That plaintiff's counsel did not object to the·trial on
the merits; that by such proceedings the alleged disclaimer was in legal effect vacated and set aside. (J.R.
266)
35. The triaU court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 20 wherein it is found that the decree
in No. 2888 civil has been and now is a valid, subsisting
and final judgment and decree of said court with respect
to the water rights ther,ein described and which are the
same water rights claimed by the plaintiff in this action,
and with respect to the water rights claimed by the plaintiff in this action, and with respect to the validity of the
mortgage of the plaintiff in said action and with respect
to the validity of the mortgage lien described in said
action. That such finding is without support in the evidence and is contrary thereto and the preponderance
thereof. (J.R. 267)
36. Th.e trial court erred in making subsection "b''
of its finding numbered 28 and each part and the whole
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thereof. That such finding is without support in the
evidence and is co.ntrary thereto and 'the preponderance
thereof. (J.R. 267)
37. The trial court erred in making subsection '' e''
of its finding numbered 28 and each part thereof. That
such finding is without support in the evidence and is
contrary thereto and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. ·
267)
38. The trial court erred in making its 1st conclusion of law and each part thereof. That such con0lusion
of law- is without support in the findings of fact and is
likewise without support in the evidence. (J.R. 268)
39. The trial court erred in making that part of its
conclusion of law wherein it concluded that Que Jensen
is entitled to 55/1728ths of the flow of said stream. That
such conclusion is without support in the evidence and is
likewise without support in the findings of fact.
40. The trial court erred in making its conclusion of
law numbered 3 and each part thereof. That such conclusion of law is without support in the evidence and is likewise without support in the findings of fact. (J.R. 267)
41. The trial court erred in making its conclusion
of law· numbered 5 and each' part thereof. That such
conclusion of law is without support in the evidence
and likewise is without support in the findings of fact.
(J.R. 270)
42. The trial court erred in making its conclusion
of law numbered 6 and the whole thereof. That such
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is likewise without support in the findiiJ.gs of fact.(J.R.
271)
43. The trial court erred in making its ju.dgment
and decree contained in paragraph 1 and each part
thereof in so far as said judgment a~fects the defendants
and appellants John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A.
Tibbs, or either of them. That such judgment and decree
is without suppo.rt in the evidence and is likewise without
support in the findings of fact and is agj:linst law. (J.R.
274)
44. The tria1 court erred in making that part of its
judgment contained in paragraph 2 thereof wherein it
adjudged that Que Jensen is awarded 55/1728th of the
flow of said stream. That such judgment or decree is
without support in the evidence and is likewise without
support in the findings of fact. (J.R. 274)
45. The. trial court erred in making paragraph 3 of
its judgment in so far as the same affects the defendants
and appellants John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A.
Tibbs, or either of them. That said paragraph 3 of the
jud~ent or decree in so far as the same affects the
defendants and appellants John Edison Spencer and
Elizabeth A. Tibbs is without support in the evidence
and is likewise without support in the findings of fact
and is against law. (J.R. 274)
46. The trial court erred in ma~ing its judgment
or decree contained in paragraph 5 thereof. That the
judgment therein contained is without support in the
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evidence and is likewise without support in the findings
of fact and is contrary to la\v. (J.R. 275)
47. The trial court erred in making its conclusions
of la\v numbered 6 and the whole thereof. That the
judgment contained in said paragraph 6 is without support in the evidence and Hkewise without support in the
findi~gs of fact and the same is contrary to law. (J.R.
267)

48. The trial court erred in not making findings of
fact, conclusions of law and decree awarding to John
Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs the rights to the
use of the waters of Thistle Greek and its tributaries
as prayed for in their counterclaim and cross complaint.
49. The trial court erred in denying the motion of
Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer to strike
each and all of the allegations sought to he stricken by
their motion filed in this cause on April 22, 19'42. ( J.R.
41 to 44)

50. The trial court erred in overruling the demurrer of Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer filed
in the above entitled cause on June 30, 1943. ( J.R. 48-49.)
ARGUMENT
We have heretofore in our statement of the case
directed the attention of the ~ourt to the testimony of
John Edison Spencer and L. Leland Larson, who at the
trial was one of co~nsel for John Edison Spencer and
Elizabeth A. Tibbs but who is no longer of counsel for
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them because he was subsequent to the trial of the cause
appointed to the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District of Utah.
It will be seen from such testimony that opposing
eounsel requested that counsel who claimed to be representing Irwin M. Price show their authority so to do.
Thereupon John Edison Spencer was called and testified
that he was authorized by Irwin M. Price to secure counsel to represent him. That he had a letter wherein he was
granted such authority. He said the letter was at his
home and that he would produce the letter the following
day. He was unable to find the letter. (Tr. 59 to 62 and
81-82) Thereupon L~ Leland Larson was called and after
being sworn testified that he is an attorney at law and
has been engaged in the practice of law since 1929; that
he has known Irwin M. Price since about 1940; that the
firm of which he was a member represented Mr. Price for
the period up to the time his firm had withdrawn; that he
had been reemployed in connection with me; that he had
called Mr. Price at San' Francisco by telephone and told
him that there was a dispute about whether he was being
represented by you and by me in this oose and asked him
if he· had authorized Edison Spencer to employ you in

]ii

this case, and he said he had, and I told him that I had
been associated in the case by you and Edison had asked
me to come in the case, and he s·aid that it was alright. I
asked him if he would ratify everything we had done in
connection with. the matter up until the present time and
he said he did and if there was any question about it go
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ahead and fight it until we were satisfied the matter was
cleared up one way or another. (Tr. 84-85)
In the light of testimony it is easy to understand
why :\Ir. Larson would make the statement he did make
as set out on pages 926 and 927 of the transcript. There
is no competent evidence to the contrary. There was
admitted in evidence administrator's Exhibits 12 and 16.
I think no la~er will seriously contend that such exhibits are com~etent evidence, except to show that I. M.
Price no longer claimed the water right in question.
When counsel for John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A.
Tibbs objected to the introduction of Exhibit 16, couns·el
represented that he offered. such exhibit for the purpose
of rebutting the evidence theretofore offered tending to
show that Irwin M. Price owned certificates 72 and 73.
(Tr. 917 to 921)
Notwithstanding the evidence above quoted and referred to the trial court in its preliminary findings. found
' that: ''Appearances had been made and various pleadings filed for and on behalf of Irwin M. Price but during
the trial it was made to appear that such appearances and
pleadings had not been authorized by him.'' ( J .R. 249)
If such a finding upon such evidence is .to be justified
then indeed is the practice of law a precarious profession. If such a finding on such a record is to be sustained
every lawyer may be subject to disbarment because he
has pretended to represent a client when he knows that
he has no such authority or because he knowingly and
falsely testified that he had, on the night before giving
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such testimony, received the express authority to continue to represent his client. All of these results can be
accomplished by opposing counsel or their clients, without any notice or knowledge to accused counsel of what
is to be attempted, securing an affidavit from the client
of accused counsel that such counsel has no authority to
represent his client. We submit that such is not the law,
never has been the law and we hope never will be the
law, not even in this case, except in the mind of the trial
court and those who may have induced it to sign the
findings in this case.

yve are

still somewhat at a loss to know just what
our duties are towards Irwin M. Price. It would certainly
ill become us to argue that he never acquired any rights
under the mortgage foreclosure pToceeding which he
prosecut~d

to judgment. Nor can we well argue that he

presently has an interest in the water rights involved in
this action because, if we did that, we would be confronted with the document marked Exhibit 16 which, while improperly called a deposition, does have the effect of disclaiming any interest in the water right here involved or
the land upon which it has at all times been used. Under
such circumstances the writer of this brief has concluded
to take Mr. Price at his word, namely: that he secured the
water certificates 72 and 73 as security for a loan made
to Richard H. Spencer who· has paid the loan and the
certificates have been returned to Richard H. Spencer
and the whole transaction cancelled.
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN A'VARDING TO
P LA I N T I F F 60/172Sths AND TO QUE JENSEN
55/172Sths OF THE FLO\V OF THISTLE CREEK
AND ITS TRIBUTARIES.

The articles of incorporation of the Indianola Irrigation Con1pany, (Indianola Irrigation C01npany's Exhibit 7) among other things, provides :
''Article 5.
''The capitol stock of this corporation shaN
be $80,000 Eighty Thousand Dollars divided into
Twenty Two Hundred shares as follows: Eighteen Hundred sha:res of class "A" stock of the
par value of Forty Dollars per share and Four
Hundred shares of Class "B" stock of the par
value of Twenty Dollars per share.''
Article 19 provides in ,substance that from March
15th to June 15th class ''A'' and class '' B '' stockhoilders
shall be entitled to an equal amount of ·water per share.
After June 15th to the following 1\farch 1st of the following year each share of class "A" stock shall entitle the
holder to V 40 of a second foot, and if there is any wa.ter
left over after supvlying the CJlass ''A'' stockholders
during the period extending from June 15th to March 1st
of the following year the same shall be divided prorata
to the stockholders of the class '' B'' stock. So far as appears the water right has been divided as provided in /the
articles of incorporation. Obviously if Que Jensen is
awarded 55/1728 of the flow of Thistle Creek he will get
more water than he is entitled to. ·There were at least
1728 shares of class ''A'' stock and 490 shares of Glass
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"B" stock outstanding at the time of the trial. (Tr. 311)
Obviously if Que Jensen gets 55/1728 of the water of
Thistle Creek as decreed to him he will get not only
water to supply his 55 shares of dass "A" water right
but also a portion of the class "B" water right. He does
not have and so far as the record shows never has had
any class '' B'' stock. Thus if the award made to Que
Jensen is affirmed the other stockholders, including
John Edison Spencer, will be deprived of a part of their
water rights.
What we have said in support of the attack made on
the conclusion of 1law and decree in our assignments
numbered 39 and 44 as to the water decreed to Que J ensen applied to t~e water right awarded to the plaintiff
James C. Whittaker which we have attacked by our as- .
signments numbered 38 and 43.
It will be noted in the conclusions of law and decree
so attacked the court concludes and decrees to plaintiff
James C. Whittaker 60/1728 of the waters of Thistle
Creek notwithstanding even if he is entitled to prevail
in this action, contrary to our contention, as to 60 acres
or shares of class ''A'' water right he is, even in such
event, not entitled to the quantity of water awarded to
him. There is no evidence that Whittaker ever owned or
even claimed any class '' B'' water right yet by the decree
he is awarded not only water stock which goes with 60
acres or shares of class ''A'' water right but in addition
thereto 60/1728 of the class '' B '' water rights of Thistle
Creek and its tributaries.
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THE CO~lPLAlNT SEEKING TO
THE :.\[ORTGAGE, THE DECR~JJ1J OF
FORECLOSURl~:. THE SHERIFF'S DEED T<) HADLOCK, BANK CO~l~fiS~IONER AND THE DEED
TO THE PLAIXTIFF THROUUH WHlCH PLAINTIFF CLAI~lS TITLE --:-\HE SO \rAGUE, AMBIGUOUS AND lTXCERT~-\IN THAT PLAINTIFF ACQillREI) XO TITLE TO WATERS IN CONTROVERSY BY REASON THEREOF.

THE

~lORTG.\nE,

FORECLO~E

Our assignments numbered 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14,
15, 17' 18, :2-1, 26, 28, 29, '30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35
36, 37 and 38 1nay well and will be grouped and discussed
under this heading in so far as they affect the claim made
by Whittaker to 60 shares or acres of Class "A'' water
right in Thistle Creek and its tributaries.
At the outset we dir.ect the attention of the court to
our statutory law and the authorities dealing with the
decree of certainty required in the description of property which is conveyed or mortgaged, in order to render
such conveyance or mortgage valid.
While it is not entirely clear whether p:laintiff seeks
to recover the right to the use of the sixty shares or
acres on the theory that the same is appurtenant to real
estate and as such subject to the law affecting real property or on the theory that the water is personal property. It would seem however in the final analysis plaintiff
bottoms his claim upon the claim that the 60 shares or
acres of water right is real estate and appurtenant to
some land. In any event the degree of certainty is the
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same whether it be real or personal property except
where the personrul property is delivered to the mortgagee. In this case neither the plaintiff nor the bank
, commissioner under whom he claims title was ever in
the possession of any water certificate nor have they or
either of them ever been in possession or had the use of
the water which is claimed by the plaintiff.

~

t

It is said. in 36 Am. Jur., sections 42, 43 and 47, page
711 and 712 that:

Section 42. ''While there is authority to
the effect that the courts more closely scrutinize,
and require a higher degree of crtainty in, the
description of property in a mortgage than in an
absolute conveyance. generally the rules as to
descriptions of real estate in mortgages conform
to those with respect to descriptions in deeds.
In this connection it has been held that mistakes
in the matter of description do not vitiate the
security any more than they would a conveyance
of the land, provided they are capable of correction, and that a mortgage wilil not be invalidated
by reason of an error in the description of the
property, in case the remainder of the description,
after rejecting the erroneous portion, is sufficiently definite to enable the land to be located.
In regard to an ambiguity in a mortgage, the
modern tendency is to allow a liberal interpretation of the description of the property and to uphold the validity of the mortgage if in any way
it is possible to arrive at the intention of the
parties thereto. Mortgages are also frequently
upheld against attacks based upon the indefiniteness of the mortgage. In this respect, any reference or description by which the premises inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tended to be dealt with maY be found and identified is generally regarded as sufficient, and a
description will not be deemed insufficient if, by
any reasonable construction of its terms, it can
be held to inclose or en1brace a particular tract
, of land. Furthermore, a description may be sufficient even though. it 1nay be necessary on account of its imperfect or indefinite character to
aid the intention of the parties by averring and
proving extrinsic facts. Accordingly, in order
to identify the property intended to he mortgaged, and to give affect to the intention of the
parties to the instrument, parol evidence is generally held admissible to explain a nristake in
description of property in a mortgage, or to ex~
plain and remove an uncertaintr. However, if
the description of the land is so vague and indefinite that effect could not be given the instrument without writing new material language into
it, parol evidence is not admissible. A mortgage
must contain such a certain and definite description of the property encumbered as to make it the
subject of the charge created."
Section 43. ''The old classification of ambiguities into "latent" and "patent" is still applied by many courts to descriptions of property
in mortgages of real estate. The general rule
under this distinction is that a patent ambiguity
in a mortgage may not be removed by parol evidence. Within the meaning of this rule, a patent
ambiguity is such an uncertainty appearing on the
face of the instrument that the court, reading the
language in the light of all the facts and circumstances referred to in the instrument, is unable, to derive therefrom the intention of the
parties, as to what 1land was to be conveyed. The
reason for the rule is that otherwise new IanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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guage would be inserted into the instrument. In
any event, it is clear that a latent ambiguity in
a mortgage may be explained and removed by
parol evidence. Within the n1eaning of this rule,
a· latent ambiguity is an uncertainty which does
not appear on the face of the instrument, but is
shown to exist for the first time by matter outside the writing, when an attempt is made to
apply the writing to the property. The reason for
the rule is that the ambiguity having been revealed by matter outside the instrument, it may
be removed in the same manner. A typical in- .
stance of a latent ambiguity 'in a mortgage is a
case where the description applies equally to
each of two things. There is a so-caliled intermediate type of ambiguity which partakes of the
nature of both a latent and patent ambiguity, to
explain which parol evidence is generally held to
be admissible."
Section 47. "The general rule is that parol
evidence is admissible where land is described
in a mortgage as a "part'?, "half", or "fraction",
with a further description sufficient to serve as
a guide to the location of the land intended to be
conveyed. This rule also preva:iils where the mortgage refers to a certain number of acres out of a
particular tract of land. Where, however, the' instrument does not contain a description sufficient
to point out the way for the :identification of the
land, parol evidence is not admissible, because the
mortgage must set forth a subject matter, either
certain within itself or capable of being made
certain by extrinsic matter to which the instrument refers.''
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For other general discussions of the certainty required in a deed or real estate mortgage see 12 L.R.A.
177; 41 C. J. 399 and cases there cited.

It has been stated generally that where the description is such that the sheriff could readily ascertain the
parcel to be sold by him and the surveyors locate it th~
description is sufficient, otherwise not. See 137 Am. St.
Rep. 255. Such is the purpose of the statutory la,w of
Utah. U.C.A. 1943, 104-13-4 provides:
''In an action for the recovery of real estate
it must be described in the complaint with such
certainty as to enable an officer upon execution
to identify it.''
The following holdings of cases win· show the trend
of judicial authority:
Bwnch vs. Crqwe (Ark.) 203 S.W. 584 wherein a
mortgage on real estate contained the following description:

''Residue of the West Half of the Southwest
Quarter ·of Section 4, Township 2 North, Range
2 East, containing 78 acres.''

It is he1ld that the description is too vague and indefinite
to constitute a valid mortgage and the same was void.
In the case of Harris vs. fVIotoda.rd (N. C.) 41 S.E.
790 the mortgage contained this description:
"Certain tract of land including Grist mill
and fixtures and one store house, including 3
acres.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

60

The whole tract consisting of 40 acres was described in
the mortgage. It was held that every deed of conveyance
must Het forth a subject matter either certain in itself or
capable of being reduced to a certainty by recurrence
to something extrinsic to which the deed refers.
In the case of Cathey vs. Lumber Oo. (N.C.) 66 S.E.
580 the deed conveyed '' 324 acres of land of a certain
tract composed of Lots 44, 97, 98 in Graham County."
The entire tract within the lots described consisted of
724 acres. It was held that the deed furnished no means
by which the 324 acres could be identified and set apart
nor did it refer to something extrinsic to it by which the
acres sought to be conveyed could he located. It is held
that it is self ~vident that a certain part of a whole cannot be set apart unless the part can be in some way identified. Therefore where a grantor undertakes to convey a part of a tract of land his conveyance must itself
furnish the means by which the part can be located;
otherwise the deed is void, for it is eilementary that every
deed of conveyance must set forth a subject matter,
either certain within itself or capable of being made
certain by recurrence to something extrinsic to which
the deed refers..
In the case of Wils10n vs. Oalhovwn (Tewn.) 11 S.W.
(2d) 908 it is said:
"The degree of certainty with which the
premises must be denoted is defined in many
books and the cases are extremely numerous in
which the subject has been illustrated. ·They are
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not all harmonious. But they agree in this, that
it is essential that the description have such particulars and tokens of identification as to render
a resort to extrinsic aid entirely needless when
the writing comes to be applied to the subject
matter. The terms may be abstract and of a general nature but they must be sufficient to fit and
· comprehend the property which is the subject of
the transaction, so that with the assistance of
external evidence the description, without being
contradicted or added to can be connected with
and applied to the very property intended and
to the exclusion of all other property.?'
An instructive case is that of Maxwell vs. M~axwell,
(Wash.) 123 P.ae. (2d) 335 where a number of other
cases are cited. It will be observed from that case that
when a conveyance is vague and ambiguous there must
be clear and convincing proof of the intention of the
grantor before a court of equity will reform the deed.
In this case apparently no attempt was made to reform
the mortgage in the course of the proceedings to foreclose the same.
The case of Jacobsen vs. Ch.rist;enS'on, 18 Utah 149,
55 Pac. 562 involved the validity of a .mortage on 700
head of sheep. While that case deals with a chattel mortgage as heretofore indicated the requirements of real
estate mortgages and mortgages on personal property
as to the definiteness in descriptions is the same or substantially so. We quote the following from the syllabus
which reflects the opinion of the court in that case:
''A mortgage of a specific number of sheep out
of a herd comprising a much larger number of
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similar sheep, which does not separate or designate the sheep mortgaged is void for uncertainty."
Applying the principles announced in the foregoing
cases to the case in hand it will be seen that the Hadlock
mortgage falls squarely within that claf;;s of mortgages
which are held void for uncertainty. R. H. Spencer at
the time he executed the mortgage to Hadlock was the
owner of 448 shares or acres of water right to Thistle
Creek and its tributaries. 'True he had mortgaged some
water right to the Federal Building and Loan Association but he was none the less the owner thereof when
the Hadlock mortgage was executed. There is absolutely nothing in the Hadlock mortgage from which the
court can conclude that the mortgage was a first mortgage. Ther~ is some very substantial evidence to the
effect that the water right which was intended to be
covered by the Hadlock mortgage was for water used
on some Indian lands in Section 3, which lands were
taken away from R. H. Spencer. H. M. Spencer, a son of
R. H. Spencer, on cross examination by counsel for the
plaintiff testified:

I·'
(

''That at one time his father secured a deed
from the Indians for that land. The deed was
secured about 30 years ago. (Tr. 386-387.) That
water was used on that land, which consisted of
160.7 acres. No decree was ever entered for that
water right." (Tr. 389-390.)
In plaintiff's complaint filed herein he apparently claims
the water right to which he seeks to quiet title is water
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used on Section 3, Township 12 South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Meridian. (See the iast part of paragraph
14. R. 8.)

The evidence in this case shows without conflict that
the ''.rater right here involved and represented by the
certificates of shares was always used on Sections 5
and 8. No part of it was ever used on Section 3.
If we examine the mortgage given to the Bank
Commissioner there is no language therein which even
remotely sheds any light on what shares or acres of
water. right was mortgaged, except that it was ''sixty
shares or acres of water right owned by R. H. Spencer
in the waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle Creek and Rock
Creek in addition to the waters used for the irrigation
of the above described land. The lands described in the
mortgage was only a part of Section 3. (See Exhibit
'' G'' attached to the amended complaint in case numbered 2888 which is marked: "John Edison Spencer,
et al. Exhibit 14.}
· There are two files in 2888, the one just referred to is
Fi1e No. 1.
The decree of foreclosure contains the same description of the sixty shares which were attempted to be
foreclosed as does the mortgage .. No more and no less.
(See paragraph 1 of the decree of foredo sure in case
2888.) Likewise the notice of sale contains identically
the sam~ description of the 60 acres or shares of water
as is contained in the mortgage. So also the return of
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the sheriff and the sheriff's deed contain identically the
same description as does the mortgage. (See abstract
plaintiff's Exhibit "W".) When the bank commissioner
made the deed out to the plaintiff he placed therein
some embelishing language. (See Tr. 97.) Of course
we believe, no one not even counsel for the plaintiff,
Whittaker, will claim that the recitals contained in such
conveyance en larged or corrected any infirmity that
theretofore existed in the title to the bank commissioner.
l\foreover, in such conveyance the bank commissioner
did not have the temerity to describe the water right conveyed, except to state that the same came out of the 448
acres or shares of class "A" water right decreed to
Richard H. Spencer. Nowhere in the entire chain of
title is there a scintilla of evidence which meets the requirements laid down by the authorities above cited,
namely: that when the conveyance or mortgage does not
contain a description sufficient to point out the way for
the identification of the land, ,evidence is not admissible
to determine the land intended because the mortgage
or other conveyance must set forth a subject matter
which is certain within itself or capable of being made
certain by extrinsic matters to which the instrument refers. None of the instruments through which plaintiff
· claims title refer to any decree or any shares of capital
stock or other matters to point out the particular water
stock, except the deed from the bank commissioner to the
plaintiff does mention that the water conveyed came out
of the 448 shares of .stock once decreed to Richard H.
Spencer.
1
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In connection with the authorities above mentioned
the attention of the court is directed to the provisions
of U.C ..A... 1943, 104-13-4. It is there provided:
· •In an action for the recovery of real pro-.
perty it n1ust be described in the complaint with
such certainty as to enable an officer, upon execution, to identify it."
This court has construed the foregoing statute in
Drake L'S. Smith, 14 Utah 35, 45 Pac. 1006; Cente.r Cre~ek
Irrig. Co. vs. Lindsay, 21 Utah 192, 60 Pac. 559; PitchstOI8
vs. Jones, et a1 76 Ut. 6, 290 Pac. 9·58.
U.C.A. 1943, 104-37-29 provides that upon the sale
of real property the officer must give to the purchaser
a certificate of the sale containing:

A particular description of the real property
sold. So also must a judgment be certain and specific.
When and only when a judment is ambiguous may it he
aided by the pleadings and other parts of the record
and if the description obtainable from it and them would
be sufficient if found in a conveyance to divest title
of the grantor it will be sufficient to sustain sales made
or possession taken under the judgment otherwise all
proceedings under it must be treated as void.''
(1)

Freeman on Judgments, 5 Ed., Vol. 1, page 165, 166,
Sec. 96:
In support of the foregoing quotation of the eminent
author there are collected a number of cases to which
the court is referred if they should desire to examine
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cases from other jurisdictions. We, however, will not
burden the court with an analysis of cases from foreign
jurisdictions, because, as we believe, the cases in this
jurisdiction point the way to a proper determination
of this phase of the case.

!;

1~

The question of the degree of certainty required
in a judgment or decree dealing with water rights has
been before our Supreme Court in a number of cases,
among them being:
Elliot vs. Whitmore, 8 Utah 254, 30 P. 984.
Smith vs. Phillips, 6 Ut. 376, 23 Pac. 932.
Nephi Irrigation Co. vs. Vickers, 15 Ut. 374, 49 Pac. 301.
Sharp vs. Whitmore, 51 Ut. 14, 168 Pac. 273.
Other cases from neighboring states are:
'Valsh vs. WaUace, 26 Nev. 299; 67 Pac. 914,918.
Riverside Water Co. vs. Sargent, 112 Cal. 230; 44 Pae.
560.
Lillis vs. Emnligrant Ditch Co., 95 Cal. 5'53, 30 Pac. 1108.
In the case of Sharp vs. Whitman it is said:
''One of the essentials of a valid judgment.
is that the judgment be definite and certain respecting the relief granted. In judgments defining
and determining conflicting claims, rights, and interests in and to the use of water in this arid
region is indispensable. The rule, the soundness
of which is self evidence, is so well established
that it would be a work of supererogation to cite
authorities illustrating and supporting it."
Whi'le the cases above cited deal with the matter of
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ciples of law there announced are equally applicable
here. It would seem to be at least as vital to the validity
of a decree to identify the water sought to be decreed
as it is to,fix the quantity of the water affeeted by the
decree.
The neressity of the requirement that a judgment
to be valid must be certain is well illustrated by the proceedings had in this case. After the so-called judgment
was rendered the sheriff, armed 'vith a writ of assistance
attempted to find the water which it was claimed had
been sold under foreclosure. He was unable to do so.
An officer of the banking department with the assistance
of the present counsel for the plaintiff undertook in
vain to find the water which he claims was conveyed to
him by the purchaser under the foreclosure proceedings.
The secretary of the defendant company was at a loss
to know what water right was sold pursuant to the foreclosure proceedings. (Tr. 86 and 199.) Finally in desperation this action is brought to quiet title to 60 ac.res
or shares of water right which at one time it is claimed
was included in the 448 shares or acres of water owned
by Richard H. Spencer.
As we have heretofore pointed out so. far as appears
from the description in the mortgage in the findings of
fact, and in the judgment itself the sixty acres or shares
now claimed by the plaintiff is equaUy applicable·to any
sixty acres or shares of the 448 acres or shares once
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brance is to read into the mortgage language foreign
thereto. So also to argue that the decree of foreclosure
described any particular sixty acres or shares of the
water right formerly owned by R. H. Spencer is bottomed
upon a false premise. It is of the very essence of a valid
judgment that it must finally fix and determine the right
of the partie.s on the .issues submitted by specifically
denying or granting the relief sought by the action.
49 C.J.S. page 5 et seq. Under the provisions of U.C.A.
1943, 104-14-4 a court may within ninety days after a
judgment is rendered, upon proper showing, s~t aside
or amend the same. In this case no aprplication was
made to amend the judgment within the time allowed
by law or for that matter has such an application yet
been made by any party to the judgment. Notwithstanding the plaintiff .in this case was not a party to the foreclosure proceeding he is in effect seeking to amend the
foreclosure proceeding under the guise of a suit to quiet
title.

'·I

:-

j.

[

It is solely because of uncertainty and ambiguity of
the decree of foreclosure and the sale had pursuant
thereto that there is any controversy between the parties to this proceeding. as to what water right was mortgaged, or as to what water right was ordered foreclosed and sold under the foreclosure proceedings. It
may be that if, by proper pleading and proof, the plaintiff had alleged that Spencer intendeq. to mortgage a
specified 60 shares or acres of water right and the proofs
had sustained such an averment the p lainti:ff would
1
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have been entitled to a decree of foreclosure on the water
right" so alleged and shown. That, however, was not done.
To permit the plaintiff, who was not even a party to the
foreclosure proceding, at this late date to re-litigate
what should have been litigated in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding is without support in either statutory
or comn10n law and is contrary to the adjudicated cases.
- See 49 C.J.S., page 436, et seq., Section 229, 230, ·and
cases cited in the foot notes.
In this connection it may be noted that the validity
and effect of a judgment must be determined from the
language contained in the judgment itself, provided if
a judgment is uncertain and ambiguous resort may be
had to the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 30
Am. Jur., 998, 81ec. 284 and cases cited in the foot note.
In this connection it will be observed that in case
numbered 2888 it was, among other matters, decreed:
"that the defendants, Richard H. Spencer, Annie H.
Spencer, John Edison Spenc~r, Robert 0. Tibbs and
Elizabeth A. Tibbs be and are hereby restrained and
enjoined from in any way assigning, transferring, disposing of or encumbering certificates of stock numbered 72 and 73 issued by the Indianola Irrigation Company, or the water rights represented by said certificates, or any other water right held or claimed by said
defendants in the waters of Thistle Creek, clear Creek
or Rock Creek until the further order of this court.''
It will further be noted that neither in the original
complaint or in his amended complaint did Hadlock
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mention or seek to foreclose a mortgage on either certificate No. 72 or 73 or any other certificate or any specified shares or acres of water belonging to Richard H.
Spencer. Hadlock was content in his mortgage foreclosure proceeding to rely on the vague, uncertain
description contained in his mortgage which as we
heretofore pointed out was void because of its uncertainty.
If the court that tried case No. 2888 had intended
that the Hadlock mortgage should have been forclosed
as to certificates 72 and 73 it would have so ordered. The
fact that it did not so order conclusively shows that the
court did not so intend. Nor could the court bind the
parties if it had so intended because to have so intended
would have been without support in the findings and
conclusions.
It is an elementary principle of law that a judgment
is valid only to the extent that the same is supported by
the pleadings. The ~a w in such particular is thus expressed by our own Supreme Court in the case of Cooke vs . .
Oooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P,ac. 83, at page 104 of the
Pacific reports:
''Every court must acquire jurisdiction frotn
its record which every court must have and keep
and which binds the court; and there is no principle better established than what is not juridically presented cannot be jurisdically decided.
Just as elemental is it that pleadings are the
juridical means of investing a court with jurisdiction of the subject matter to adjudicate it and
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that a judgment or derree beyond or not within
them is a nullity, for the court is bound by its
record. These are inunutable elements.''
In the case of Stockyards Nat. Book v:s.
Br:agg, et al, 67 Utah 60; 2-!5 Pac. 966 it is said
that:
''Though court may have jurisdiction of subject n1atter and person, it may not act or make
an order or render a judgment beyond or in
excess of jurisdiction.''
'' "\V"hile requisite jurisdictiona'l facts need
not be recited in order or judgment to properly
invest court with jurisdiction of subject matter,
they must somewhere be made to appears in record that describes matter for court's adjudication and is foundation of judgment or order.''
''Judgment which is beyond or not supported
by pleadings must fail.''
"Judgment must fail on showing on face of
mandatory record that it was obtained at variance
with practice of court or contrary to well recognized principles and fundam~ntals of law.''
''Fact apparent from mandatory record,
showing that fundamental law was disregarded
in establishing of judgment, will render it void
for all purpose·s.''
"Judgment founded on record, showing that
fundamenta llaw was disregarded in its establishment, is subject to direct and collateral attack,
and will sua sponte he noticed by courts and acted
upon by them without regard to wishes or relations of parties named on record.''
1

The foregoing quotations are from the syllabi ·to
the opinion and reflect the opinion of the court.
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The 'law with respect to the necessity of judgment or
decree being supported by pleadings, is discussed in
Vol. 1 Freema;n 'On Judgments 6 Ed. Sec. 97, pag1e 168.
49 C. J. S. page 95, et seq., sect~orns 40 and 41.
In connection with such law it will be noted that
there is nothing in the complaint which even remotely
indicates that plaintiff in 2888 sought to foreclose a
mortgage on certificates 72 or 73 or any other water
represented by certificates or any water right which-was
appurtenant to any particular tract of land. So far as
is made to appear from the allegations of the complaint
the plaintiff may have sought to foreclose its mortgage
on any 60 acres or shares of water right owned by R. H.
Spencer.
Much of the controversy in the court below centered
around certificates numbered 72 and 73. The facts relating to these certificates show: On either June 1, 1918
or Nov. 25, 1931, Richard H. Spencer and Annie Spencer
attempted to convey 160 shares of Class "A" stock to
the Indianola Irrigation Company. (See Indianola Irrigation Company Exhibit 5) The acknowledgment of the
notary says that Richard H. Spencer and Annie Spencer,
his wife, together with a number of others acknowledged
the conveyance on June 1, 1918. There is some evidence
that the conveyance was actually made on November 25,
1931. (See ~r. 267) It of course may be that R. H. Spencer executed the instrument twice, that is to say, his
original signature may have become detached from the
original! instrument so that it became necessary to have
Mr. Spencer sign again.
It would be a very dangerous precedent to set by
our courts to say that an acknowledgment of an instrument which appears regular on its face should be held
for nought by the statement of a witness testifying after
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the lapse of 16 years that the witness signed at a later
date. 'fhe most that can possibly be said for such testimony is that it carries an inference that it was not signed
before. It will further be noted that a red ink line is
drawn through the \Yords : ·'dated this 25th day of
November, 1931.'' Such lines were drawn through the
instrument when it was recorded. (See Tr. 43) It would
seem that the only possible reason for drawing the red
ink line through the date was to indicate that there was
something wrong with the date. If the acknowledgment
shows the instrument was actually orignally signed on
the date of the acknowledginent the way to make that
evident would be to strik~ out as was done the words :
"dated this 25th day of November, 1931."
Whatever the fact may be in such particular we do
not, in the light of oth~r facts appearing in the evidence,
deem it of special importance.

It will be seen that the deed, Indianola Irrigation
Company Exhibit 5, does not describe any particular
water right conveyed or intended to be conveyed to the
company. It would have been a simple matter for the one
who drew the deed to have designated the particular
water right that was intended to he conveyed by describing the land to which it was appurtenant. If that had
been done this litigation would probably not have arisen.
So long as deeds are drawn which do not meet the, requirements of the law with respect to the description of the
property conveyed, confusion and 'litigation is almost
certain to follow.
We, therefore, contend that the deed which Spencer
made- to the Indianola Irrigation Company is void for
uncertainity in that an attempt was made to convey to
the company a part of a larger number of acres of water
without placing in the instrument of conveyance any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

74
information whatever which could identify the property
intended to be conveyed.
In connection with what we have said about the
necessity of conveyance being certain and ·definite we
direct the attention of the court to U. C. A. 1943-100-1-11
wherein it is provided that: "water rights shall be transferred by deed in substantially the same manner as real
estate.'' But as~uming that some water right was conveyed to the Irrigation Company how stands the case?
In case numbered 2888 and in this case the defendant
Indianola Irrigation Company sought to have certificates
numbered 72 and 73 cancellea because it claimed that
Richard 1Spencer had secured the isf:mance of such
certificates by representing that he had that amount of
stock free and clear of encumberances. We shall presently
point out in detail the facts in such particular. For the
present if it be assumed that certificates numbered 72
and 73 were subject to cancellation and that the court
properly cancelled ~uch certificates in this action it
necessarily follows that the water right represented by
such certificates is and has been appurtenant to the land
upon which the water was and has been used since long
before the organization of the irrigation company. So far
as we are advised the adjudicated cases and the text
writers are agreed that when a contract is rescinded the
parties thereto are placed in the same position as they
were in before the contract was entered into. The law is
thus stated in 12 Am. Jur., page 1031, Sec. 4·51:
1

''The very idea of rescinding a contract implies that what has been parted with shall be restored on both sides. Releasing one party from
his part of the agreement and excusing him from
making the other party whole do not seem agreeable to reason or justice. Hence, the general rule
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is that a party who wishes. to rescind an agreement
must place the opposite party in status quo."
The results are the same regardless of the reasons
for making the rescision. Thus in its final analysis it is
not of controlling importance whether the transaction
whereby Spencer executed a purported deed to the. com-.
pany for certificates 72 and 73 which purported deed is
void for uncertainty because not describing the: water
right attempted to be conveyed or whether the transaction
is· set aside because of misrepresentation made by Spencer. In either event the water right is appurtenant to the
land. That is to say the water right would be the
same as if no deed of conveyance had been made or attempted to be made. From what has been said, however,
we do not concede the evidence shows th~t Spencer made
any misrepresentations touching the number of unencumbered shares of stock he had when he made a deed to
the company. The evidence shows the follows:
1

Spencer mortgage to the Federal Building and Loan
Association was not for 285 shares. or acres of water
but 223 acres. (See Indianola Irrigation Company's
exhibit 1) He made a mortgage to Hugentobler for 55
acres. There were 3 acres appurtenant to a small a tract
of land conveyed. Add to this the 160 acres of water
which was attempted to be conveyed to the company we
have a total of 441 acres. There is some evidence that a
water right was allocated to the cemetery lot and we
have heretofore directed the attention of the cou.rt to
the testimony to the effect that R. H. Spencer, at one
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time, used some water on a tract of Indian land, the deed
to which he lost. (Tr. 390) It will be seen that all of the
448 acres of water is accounted for, except the 60 acres
claimed hy the plaintiff.
There is nothing in the mortgage to indicate whether
it is a first or a second mortgage. It does appear that the
bank was out to g~t aU the security that Spencer had
available.
Much of the difficulty that the Indianola Irrigation
Company fiJids itself in is due to the fact that it gave to
the Federal Building and Loan Association 285 shares
of stock and now seeks to claim that Richard H. Spencer
was responsible therefor when in truth and in fact the
difficulty was apparently brought about by the company
having issued certificates of stock to H. M. Spencer (the
sons of R. H. Spencer and one of the mortgagors of the
property mortgaged to the Federal Building and Loan
Association) which stock H. M. Spencer mortgag~d to
the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork. The Company
then made a second issue of stock for the same water
right to the Federal Building and Loan Association. The
Indianola Irrigation Company is now apparently quite
wi'lling to have the decree in this case award to plaintiff
Whittaker 60/1728 and to Hugentobler 55/1728 of all the
class '' B '' water rights of its stockholders notwithstanding there is not one scintilla of evidence to justify such
an award. We say that because it is reasonable to assume
that the Indianola Irrigation Company took part in
formulating the decree in this case. Be that as it may it
I
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has not yet raised its voice in protest against the o.bvious
foot that both "\Vhittaker and Hugentobler have been
awarded more water than they are entitled to, namely:
60/1728 and 33/1728, not only of class ''A'' water rights
but also of the class "B" water of Thistle Creek and its
tributaries.
Plaintiff also elaims that the Spencers may not prevail in their attack on his title to the sixty shares because:
1. Both RiC'hard H. Spencer and John Edison

Spencer have in the present action disclaimed any interest to the water right in controversy.
2. That by reason of the judgment r,endered in case
2888 the matter of ownership of th€ right to the sixty
shares has been adjudicated.

As to plaintiff's claim that R. H. Spencer and John
Edison Spencer have disclaimed any interest in the water
in dispute in the present case the pleadings filed 'herein
show that the water right claimed by the plaintiff was
to the right to the use of water to irrigate 60 acres of
land in Section 3, Township 12 .South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Meridian. (See paragraph~14 of co:rp_plaint R.
7 and 8)
To the complaint John Edison Spencer and Richard
H. Spencer filed their motion to strike on various
grounds; Among the portions of the complaint so sought
to be stricken were the· first 11 lines of paragraph 14.
{R. 41-44)
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Richard H. Spencer and John Edison <Spencer also
filed a demurrer to the complaint on various grounds,
among thern being that it could not be ascertained from·
the complaint what water right the plaintiff claimed and
particularly that it could not be ascertained from said
complaint what particular land in Section 3, if any, the
alleged water of the plaintiff was ever used.
The demurrer was upon the ground that plaintiff's
<;lain1 to a water right was barred_ by various provisions
of the statute of limitation. ( J.R. 48-49) The disclaimer
upon which plaintiff relies reads as follows:
''Comes now Richard H. Spencer and John
Edison Spencer (spelled John Edson Spencer in
plaintiff's complaint) each for himself and not
one for the other and for answer to plaintiff's
complaint alleges:
Defendants disclaim all right, title or interest
of whatsoever character or extent, in or to any
and all of the premises and water rights described
in plaintiff's complaint and ·especia'lly that particular alleged water right described in paragraph
VIV of plaintiff's complaint."
Larson and Larson
Attorneys for the defendants
Richard H. Spencer and John
Edison Spencer.
The answer and disclaimer is verified by R. H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer. (J.R. 52-53 and 54)
It would seem clear from the pleadings above referred to and quoted that the subject matter therof was
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water used for the irrigation of Section 3 and no other.
It could not be said to refer to the water right represented by certificates 72 or 73 because the same were
not mentioned or referred to in the pleadings of the
plaintiff nor were the same mentioned in the decree of
foreclosure.
~Ioreover

the plaintiff could not weH have claimed
any rights to the waterright represented by certificates
8-1 or 86 because the water right represented by such
certificates come out of the water right which was foreclosed by the Federal Building and Loan .A:ssociation 's
proceeding in which proceeding W. H. Hadlock, John A.
Malia, state bank commissioner of Utah, for the use and
benefit of the creditors of the North Sanpete Bank, a
corporation, were parties defendants and were foreclosed
from making any claim to the water appurtenant to the
land and water right which was appurtenant to the land
covered by their mortgage, including the 223 acres of
water which R. H. Spencer mortgaged to that corporation. The Indianola Irrigation Company was also a defendant in such action and any right that it might have
to the water covered by the Federal Building and Loan
Association's mortgage was likewise cut off and disposed
of. It thus remained for the p laintiff and the Indianola
1

Irrigation Company to seek some means to get at certificates numbered 72 and 73 to make up for their failure
to appear in the foreclosure proceeding of the Federal
Building and Loan Association and defend such rights
as they might have to the water right there involved.
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As we have repeatedly said there is not a scintilla
of evidence in this ease which shows or tends to show
that the plaintiff ever had or at any time prior to the
present proceeding even claimed any right to certificates
numbered 72 or '73 or to the water right which was appurtenant to the lands in section 5 to which such water right
was appurtenant. We repeat that such results were·
brought about because the mortgage given to Hadlock,
Bank Commissioner and the deed given to the Irrigation
Company wer.e so vague and uncertain that no one· could
ascertain from the language used therein what water
right was intended to he mortgaged or conveyed. It is because of the results that followed in the wake of such a
method of attempting to convey mortgaged property that
the courts have uniformly held that the same are void. In
this connection it should be noted that at the time John
Edison Spencer made the disclaimer he had every reason
to believe and did believe that the title to the water right
repre,sented by certificates numbered 72 and 73 belonged
to Price. (Tr. 599 et seq.) ,
The plaintiff has pleaded res judicata and an estoppel as against both the administrator and John Edison
Spencer and in his reply plaintiff's counsel in the court
below argued such questions at considerable length at the
conclusion of the triaL Of course if the mortgage given to
Hadiock, the decree of .foreclosure and the deeds to the
Bank Commissioner and to Spencer are valid there can
ibe no doubt, but that the Spencers are estopped from
asserting any claim to the water right dispos·ed of in
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such proceeding and the conveyances made in pursuance
thereof. We have not and shall not contend to the contrary. On the other hand if the Inortgage given by R. H.
Speneer to the bank on 60 shares or acres of water right
and the proceedings had to foreclose the same or the
deeds given ofter the mortgage was foreclosed are so
uncertain and ambiguous in the matter of describing the
subject matter as to render the same void then and in
such case the doctrines of estoppel and res judicata have.
no application. We will be interested in having_ counsel
for plaintiff cite a c.ase or other authority where it is
held that a void decree or doeument may work either on
estoppel or be aided by res judicata. We understand the
law to he that a void instrument is wholly without lega!l
effect for any purpose.
It will also be noted that by the decree entered in
this case a cloud is cast upon all of the water rights of
Thistle Creek and its tributaries. It does not describe
any water right by either reference to certificates of
stock or 'by a description of the land to which it is appurtenant. Any one purchasing or taking any of the
water rights of Thistle Creek will be unable to ascertain
what particular water right is awarded to plaintiff. The
fact that plaintiff is unable to identify his claimed water
right does not entitle him to a deeree clouding all the
water rights in Thistle Creek.

In connection with the water right claimed by the
plaintiff the e.ourt 's attention is again called to the deed
which Richard H. Spencer gave to John Edison Spencer
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In September of 1933 (See John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 12) and the fact that he has been in possession of
that property, together with the water right used thereon
since that time and it is reasonable to assume that he has
paid the taxes on such land, together with the water used
to irrigate the same ever since the same was conveyed to
him. This action was not brought until July 21, 1941,
more than seven years after John Edison Spencer received the conveyance above mentioned, which it will be
observed conveyed to him 80 acres of water right in
Thistle Creek It wiN also be noted that John Edison
Spencer did not sign the mortgage which plaintiff
sought to foreclose in cause numbered 2888. Under such
a state of the record the plaintiff has lost any right to the
water used upon the land which land and water right was
so conveyed to John Edison Spencer. U.C.A.1943, 100-J-4
and Hammond vs. Johnson 94 Ut. 20; 66 P. (2d) 894.
John Edison Spencer held and used both the land and
water adversely to the plaintiff and its claimed grantor
or mortgagor, Richard H. Spencer, for more than th~
statutory period.
It will be noted that the trial court awarded judgnlent against John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A.
Tibbs jointly and severa1ly in favor of the plaintiff for
costs taxed at $75.80, (J.R. 273) and likewise awarded
judgment in favor of the defendant Indianola Irrigation
Company, a corporation, and against John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs jointly and severally costs
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ror. (Assignn1ents -!-:.?and -!5.) 'Ve an' at a loss to tmderstand upon what theory such an award was n1ade. If
rosts have any relation whatsoevf'r to the degree of fault
that the party has been guilty of in an action certainly
if there was fault it was primarily the fault of Richard
H. Spencer. So far as Elizabeth A. Tibbs is concerned
she was an onlooker. If any costs should be awarded
(which we contend it shou1d not be) in favor of either the
plaintiff or the Indianola Irrigation Company we submit
that it should be against the administrator and not
against ·either John Edison Spencer or Elizabeth A.
Tibbs.
THE WATER RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THIS CONTROVERSY ARE APPURTENANT TO LANDS
OWNED BY JOHN EDISON SPENCER AND ELIZABETH A. TIBBS.
The trial court found that the water rights claimed
by John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs are not
appurtenant to the lands conveyed to them by Richard H.
Spencer. We have assigned such finding as error in assignments numbered 17 and 22, 24, 2·5, 26 and 27.
Whether or not water represented by stock in a
mutual irrigation company is appurtenant to land so
that it wil.l pass with a deed to the land as an appurtenance is a question of fact to he decided in each case. The
mere fact that water is represented by stock certificates in
a water company is in no sense controlling. The question
was first before our Utah Supreme Court in 1898 in the
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case of Smith vs. North Canyon W.at·er Compa"YYIY, 16 Ut.
194. The court there held that water represented by
stock in a water company was under the facts of that
case appurtenant to the land in question. The court has
consistently from that date forward treated the problem
as a fact question and as recently as October of 1945
reaffirmed the rule that water represented by stock in a
water company could in law be appurtenant to the land
upon which the water was used. See Milford State Bamk
vs. W·est Field Canal & Irr. Co., 100 Utah 528, 162 P. 2d.
101. The Utah cases have never treated the fact that the
water was represented by the stock in a corporation as
controlling.

In the Milford 8t1ate Bamk vs. West Field Canal &
Irr. Co., oase, supra, the owner of the land had conveyed
it by instruments placed in escrow, together with all
water. and water rights thereunto be'longing. By inadver·
tence a certificate purpoting to represent 49 shares of
water in a corporation was deposited in escrow with the
land contract. The seller contended that only a portion
( 28 shares) of the 49 had ever been used on the land and
argued that all, that was conveyed by the agreement was
the land and the water which. was appurtenant thereto.
The Supreme Court adopted this view and said: (p. 53~
of the Utah reports).
''The record is sufficient to sustain the finding that Blackner bought the lands from Mrs.
Daker with the appurtenant water right: that the
appurtenant water right was 28 shares of the
capitol stock of the irrigation company on the
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basis of one share of stock to each acre of land.
Shares of stock of an irrigation company issued
in place of the vested water right for lands in an
irrigation district are appurtenant unless they
have been transferred and put to a beneficial use
upon other lands.''
The court had a like problem before it in Easlt
River Bottom Trater Co. 'l'S. Bo·yce, 102 Ut~ah 149, 128 P.
2d. 277, (1942). There had been a duplicate issue of seven
shares of water stock in the plaintiff company. This
duplicate issue was represented by a stock certificate
which had been pledged to a bank as security for a loan.
Suit was brought by the irrigation company to have the
duplicate issue declared void. The bank defended on the
grounds that it was a bona fide purchas.er without notice.
The Supreme Court decided against the bank holding that
the water in the irrigation company was still appurtenant'
to the land and charged the bank with notice of this fact.
The court said:
"The corporation was a loose sort of a mutual agreement for the unified management and
distribution of the water to the owners. The
limited and restrictive words for the purpose of
'control, management and distribution' is not a
conveyance separating a water right from the
land does not vest title or the right of use in the
corporation within the provisions of Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, Section 100-1-10 and Section
100-1-1. . . The water right was never severed
from the land and is still appurtenant thereto."
The hest discussion of. this problem in the Utah
eases is contained in Re: Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114,
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228 P. 748, (1924) .. There, by will, a testator devised
specified lands to certain of his children. The remaining
children were named as the residual legate~s. In the
devise of the land the testator failed to mention water
rights for the land. The water was represented by stock
in a corporation and during his life the water represented by this stock had been used on the lands specifically
devised. The residual legatees contended that the ·stock
was personal property and came to them as a part of the
residue of the estate. The other children, to whom the
land had been devised, contended that the stock was
appurtenant to the land devised and passed with it as an
appurtenance even though the will had failed to mention
it. The Supreme Court held that the water was appurtenant. The problem of water represented by stock in a
corporation b~ing appurtenant to land was discussed in
some detail. The court said:

1",

''Appellants, claiming the 44 remaining
shares of water stock as an appurtenant to tract
A of the real estate, prayed for its distribution to
them. It was alleged and not denied that the water
right was used in connection with the land, and
that the land is of little or no value without the
water right. The trial court found that the water
right had been used for the irrigation of the lands
owned by the testator, but that notwithstanding
such use the same was personal property, and
was not included in the devise to appellants. The
question is whether a water right so owned and
used will pass by the devise, without mention, with
the land as an appurtenance ... " (then followed
citation of and quotations from the statutes which
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were what are now sections 100-1-10 and 100-1-11,
U.C.A. 1943)
Referring to what is now section 100-1-10 which provides
in part:
"'Yater rights shall be transferred by deeds
in substantially the same manner as real estate,
except when they are represented by shares of
stock in a corporation . . . ''
The court said :
''The latter provision is obviously intended
for the conveyance of water rights in cases where
'the water rights are severed from the land upon
which the water has been used, and separately
conveyed. In such a case if the water right i:s
represented by shares of stock in a corporation,
the plain implication is that it may be transferred
by a transfer of the certificate of stock, in the
ordinary manner, as personal property. But that
does not necessarily mean that water rights thus
represented may not be an appurtenance to the
land upon which the water is used, and pass as
such with a conveyance of the land.'·'
The court then quoted with approval from Weil on
Water Rights, 3d. Ed. Sec. 1269 (which is quoted below
in this brief under heading "Text Writers", and also
cited with approval cases from Washington, Idaho and
California, and distinguished an earlier Utah case which
while using some language indicating a different view
is not in conflict with the other Utah cases. It was then
stated that whether water represented by stock is appurtenant is a fact question. The court went on to conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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elude that nnder the facts of that case the water rights
represented by water stock were appurtenant to the lands
devised. Said the court:
"The right to the use of water for irrigation
is inseparately related to land .. Without its continued use upon land the right ceases. The customary practical presumption is that water rights
used upon lands are appurtenant to and a part of
it ... "
"Upon principle and authority we conclude
that the water right referred to passed by the will
as an appurtenance to the land selected .by the
executor, and that the same should be distributed
to the appellants with the land.''
Other Utah cases have touched on the problem. In
1898 it was presented to the court in Smith vs. Morth
Canyon Wat1er Co., 16 Utah 194. There a deed to lands
failed to mention water. The water in question was repI'esented by stock. The court held that the water passed
with the land as an appurtenance.
In Cortella vs. Salt Lake City, 9.3 Utah 236, land
owners exchanged their water for canal water from the
private canal of Salt Lake City. The contention was that
the water was made personal property because reduced
to possession by the city in its canal. The court held that
even th'Ough so reduced to possession in private canal
the water was still appurtenant to the land because it was
used thereon in exchange for waters that had been appurtenant. No stock in a corporation was involved, but
the c'ase is helpful becaus-e it is generally held that water,

a
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reduced to possession in a private canal, is personal property. Yet the court held that the water was an appurtenant (real property) because of its use and the nature of
the exchange agreement.
In Genola To·u:n L'S. Salltaqui·n City, 96 Utah 88, 80
P. 2d 930 the court noted the p€CUliar nature of ·ownership of stock in a mutual irrigation company. It said:
(page 101)

''Stock in a mutual company entails the right
to demand such stockholders aliquot share of the
water in proportion as his stock holding bears. to
all the stock. Water rights are pooled in a mutual
company for convenience of operation and more
efficient distribution, and perhaps for more convenient transfer. But the stock certificate is not
like the stock certificate in a company operated
for profit. It is really a certificate showing an
undivided part ownership in a certain water supply. It embraces the right to call for such undivided part according to the method of distribution.''
To the same effect see Smithfield vs. Union Central Life,
105 Utah 468.
In Fisher vs. Bofltrntiful City, 21 Uf:tah 29, plaintiffs
aud others associated together under the name of Barton
Creek Irrigation Company. Bountiful sought to control
and manage the distribution of their water rights. At
page 34 of the Utah reports the court held that the rights
of the plaintiffs were appurtenant to their lands. It does
not clearly appear, except from the name of the company,
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whether or not the water rights were represented by
~tock.

In Woolley vs. Dowse, 86 Utah 221, it was held that
the water in question was not appurtenant to land which
had heen mortgaged. The holding was placed on the
grounds that the water was not in fact used on ~he land
rather than upon the grounds that it was stock in a
mutual company. The fact that the holding was put on
the grounds that it was not appurtenant in fact because
not used on the land rather than on the fact that it was
stock in a mutual company shows that the c~mrt did not
consider that fact to be controlling.
In Geo.rge v. Robilnson, 23 Ut. 79, the court held the
water there involved was not appurtenant. The suit was
for breach of warranty. Plaintiff was grantee under a
deed conveying land and appurtenances. Thereafter defendant lost use of the water and sued for breach of
warranty. The water was represented by stock in an
irrigation company. In holding that the water was not
appurtenant to the land the court noted various. things
which it apparently considered to be important in arriving at that conclusion. It said:
''In fact, the fair result of plaintiff's own
testimony is to the effect that the water of Corn
Creek, of which that in dispute is a part, is and
was owned by the corporation; that each share
of its capital stock represented sufficient water to
irrigate one acre of land; and that stockholders
only were entitled to water for purposes of irrigation. There is nothing to show that any partiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

91
eular share of stork represented any water for
any particular land. So far as appears from the
proof, each stockholder had tl1e right to use the
water to which he was entitled on any land he
saw fit. Under such arrangements ... the water
cannot be appurtenant.''
It further appears in that case that the grantor in the
deed did not own any water and the grantee knew that
such was the fact. Again the -court failed to place the
holding on the fact that the water was represented by
stock. It reason~d as to whether it was appurtenant
in fact and based its holding on the conclusion that it
was not. Any language in the case indicating that water
in a water company could not be appurtenant to land
was overruled by the later opinion of In Re J~ohnson's
Estate, st~tpra, where George v. Robinson is expressly
noted.
There is not a single Utah case which was disclosed
by our search where the court has held that water in
a water corporation cannot in law be appurtenant to land.
The cases uniformly treat the matter as question of fact.
WHEN IS WATER APPURTENANT1
If it be accepted, as well it must, that water represented by stock may or may not be appurtenant to land
depending upon whether or not it is appurtenant in fact,
then our problem is to determine when water is appurtenant. This is answered in the case of Thompson v.
McKinney, 91 Ut. 89, 63 P. 2d 1056. The suit was an action to quiet title to lands and waters claimed to be
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appurtenant thereto. The question was whether or not
certain waters were in fact appurtenant to certain lands.
The water was not represented by stock in a corporation.
The court discussed many eases dealing with the question of when water is appurtenant in fact. The court
rejected the contention that only those waters which
were ''indispensable'' to the use of land were appurtenant. It quoted with approval from 2 Kinney on Irr.
and 'Vater Rights, ( 2d Ed.), Sec. 1011, p. 1904 as follows:
''The doctrine is well settled in the States of
the arid region, that a water right used in connection with a certain tract of land for the irrigation ·
thereof, where necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land, together with the ditch, canal,
or other works necessary to conduct the water to
the place of use, become appurtenance'S to the
land provided they are all owned by the sam€
parties.''
This idea of being owned by the same partie·s is not
in conflict with the concept that water represented by
stock can be appurtenant because of the holding in cases
such ·as East River Bottom v. Boyce, supra, 102 Utah
149, supra, and Genola Town v. Santaquin, 96 Utah 88,
supra, holding that the owner of the stock certificate
is in fact an owner in common with the other stockholder£
of the w.ater. The same concept formed the basis of a
later opinion ;hY ,the Supreme Court in Smithfield W.
Bench Irr. Co. v. Union Central Life Ins . .Co., 105 Ut.
468, 142 P. 2d 866. The court there .said:
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~·The waters of a mutual irrigation company belong to the users, the company being the
mere distributing and apportioning trustee . . .
The Company cannot sell any of the water without
consent of the stockholders or for nonpayment
of dues if the articles of incorporation make the
stock liable for such costs and expenses. Like. wise the company cannot permit the water to be
lost by non-use thereof as long as any shareholder desires to and is in a position to use the
water. \Vater undistributed may be used by any
stockholder in a position to use it. The shareholders are in effect owners in common of the
waters with certain limitations as between one
another governing the use thereof.'' Citing many
cases.

In the Thompson v. M cKinnew case, supra, the court
also quoted with approval from a Montana case Lensing
v. Day, 67 :Mont. 382,215 P. 999, as follows:
"A water right, acquired by appropriation
and used for a beneficial and necessary purpose
in connectio~ with a given tract of land, is an
appurtenance thereto, and as such passes with
the conveyance of the land unless expressly reserved from the grant.''
It must be concluded that whenever water is appropriated for use on particular lands and is so used
thereon for beneficial purposes it becomes appurtenant
to that land. For other cases discussing the problem
of when water becomes appurtenant to land see Kinney,
Water Rights, 2d Ed., Sec. 1005-1016; Connant v. Deep
Creek & Curlow Valley Irr. Co., 23 Ut. 627, 6'6 P. 188;
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Utah 'Metai & Tunnel Company v. Groesbeck, 62 Utah
251, 219 P. ·248.

Lr··.·"'

Once it is established that the water is in fact appurtenant to land (and this is always a question of fact)
then the cases are numer0us holding that it passes with
a conveyance of the land without being menti'oned in the
deed of -conveyance. In Black v. johns1on, 81 Utah 410,
it was held that tax deed conveying lands sold for taxes
carried with it "one city lot of water right" even though
not mentioned in the tax deed. In Tkomps10n v. McKim,..
wey, 91 tlt. 89, 63 P. 2d 1056 it was held that a mortgage
on lands also mortgaged the water which was appurtenant to it even though no m·ention of the water was
made in the mortgage. See also the recent case of Fetrofes~a v. Rio Gra;nde R. R. Co., 110 Utah----~-, 169 P. 2d 808
decided in June, 1946; Anderson v. Hamson, 50 Ut;ah 149,
167 P. 254; LeBeJe v. Smith, 64 Ut. 242, 229 P. 88.
TEXTWRITERS ALL HOLD THAT WATER REPRESENTED BY STOCK IN A MUTUAL COMPANY
CAN BE .AND OFTEN IS APPURTENANT TO LAND
AND THAT IN EACH CASE IT IS A QUESTION
OF FACT.
The writers· o£ text ·books on water rights all agree
with the Utah cases above cited that water rep.resented
by stock in a mutual comp:any can be and often is ap~
purtenant to the land upon which used. Whether it is
or is not in each case is a question of fact. Quotation
from W eil, the leading writer on western water law is
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representative of the pervailing legal thought on this
matter.
In Weil on lVa.ner f!,ights Sectio'n 1269, (cited with
approval by the Utah Supren1e Court in In re: Johnson's
. Estate, 64 Ut. 114) it is stated:
''So long as the company remains purely
a mutual one, the certificate of stock rep.res·ents
the water right. A transfer or sale of the certificate is governed by much the same rules as those
else·where considered regarding transfers of
water rights. Whether the water right is an appurtenance to the stockholders land is a question of fact in each case, as is also whether on
a sale of the land the water right pa:sses as an
appurtenance. A sale of the certificate may be
made separate from the land for use on other
land and will transfer the water right~ .. On the
other hand in the absence of any separate sale
-of the certificate or of any other evidence of any
express intention to make a severance, a sale of
the land on which the ~ater is used will carry the
water right and the right to the certificate as an
appurtenance.''
The section is also cited with approval in Berg v. Y·akrim.a
C. Co., 83 Wash. 451, 145 P. 619.
InKinneyonlrrig·at~onand

Water Rights, Sec.1484,
the rule is stated that water represented by stock in a
water company generally is not appurtenant. He, however, eites cases from California holding in accord with
the Utah rule and the rule stated by W eil.
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Hutchings, Selected Problems of the Law of Water
Rights in the West, p. 385 cites W eil with approval f~r
proposition that appurtenancy is a question of fact.

CASES FOR MOTHER STAT·ES:
Western states uniformly hold that water represented by stock in a mutual company may be and often
is appurenant to land.
CAL~FORNIA: In Re: Thomas Estate, 147 Cal.
236, 81 P. 5q9, it was held that the conveyance of land
by the original owner of a water right which was appurtenant to a certain tract of land to a mutua). water
corporation, for the better management and distribution
of the water, did not segregate the water from the land
as such appurtenance, but merely changed its form; andJ
hence under the Civil Oo,de, Section 1311, providing that
every devise of land conveys all the estate of the devisor,
and therefore, that a devise of land carried with it the
share of stock 1n the company as appurtenant to the land;
and therefore, it was entirely proper for the trial court
to direct a transfer of stock to the devisee.

COLORADO: Denv,er J,oviJnt Land Barnk v. Markham, 107 P. 2d 313 : Here the Court said:
"Where the water right is appurtenant to
the stockholder's land is a question of fact, as
is also whether, on a sale or transfer of the land,
the water right passes as an appurtenance *' *' •
The doctrine which makes it a question of fact
whether the water right is appurtenant to the
land and whether it passes by a lease or other
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conYeyanee seems to us sound.'' (Citing other
Colorado eases.)
Comstock r. Olney Sprin.<J & Dra.iru1ge Dist., Colo. 50 P.
2d 531.

· ·"' "' "' where the eompany is a n1utual irrigation cmnpany, or as here, a mutual reserv?ir
company, organized, not for profit, but for the
convenience of its members in the management
of the irrigation system and in the distribution
to them of water upon their lands * * * ownership of shares of stock in the corporation is but
incidental to ownership of water right, which
is appurtenant to the land upon which the water
is used.''
IDAHO: Ireton v. Idaho Irr. Co., 30 Idaho 310, 164
P.687, 689:

Action to foreclose real estate mortgage. It
denied that the \Yater right, represented by stock,
real property appurtenant to the land and argued
it was not covered by the mortgage on the land.
court held to the contrary stating:

was
was
that
The

''While this court has held shares in an
irrigation company to be personal property the
fact must not he lost sight of that a water right
is, as heretofore shown, real estate, and that in
case of a mutual irrigation company, not organized for profit, but for the convenience of its
members in the ·management of the irrigation
system and in the distribution to them of water
for use upon their lands in proportion to their
stock in the corporation is but incidental to the
ownership of water right. Such shares are muniSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ments of title to the water right, are inseparable
from it and ownership of them passes with title
which they evidence.''
WASHINGTON: Berg v. Y a.kima Valley Canol C'().,
83 Wash. 451, 145 P. 619:
The question involved was whether or not water
rights represented by stock certificates passed with a
lease of lands. The contention was made that they were
not appurtenant and would not pass as an appurtenance. The court held to the contrary stating:
"In a mutual company the stock certificate
represents the water right. A transfer or sale of
the certificate may be made separate from the
land for use on other land, and will transfer the
water right. But where it has not been thus sold
or transferred, the question whether the water
right is appurtenant to the stockholder's land
is generally a question of fact, as is also whether,
on a sale or transfer of the land, the water right
pass as an appurtenance * * *In the present case
the water was appurtenant to the land."
l\1:0NTANA: See Y ellJJwstone V~al~ey Co. vs. AsStociated llfortgage Investors, Inc., -et al. 88 Mont. 73, 290

P. 255.

FEDERAL: Ackroyd vs. Winston, 113 Fed. 2nd
657. This case arose under the laws of the State of Montana and the Circuit Court discusses cases from several
western states including Utah and concludes that water
represented by stock in· a mutual company can be and
is often appurtenant to land. It also holds that whether
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it i~. ttppurtenant in a particular case is a question of fact.
THE INDIANOLA IRRIGATION COl\lPANY IS A
~IUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY
Article 6 of the Articles of Incorporation of the Indianola, Irrigation Company provides:
''The purpose for which this corporation is
formed and the pursuit and business to be engaged in is to manage, regulate, control and distribute the waters of Thistle Creek, its branche~.
to and among its stockholders in proportion tQ
their and each of their respective rights to the use
thereof, to construct and maintain all such dams,
ditches, canals, gates, reservoirs, flumes and
other and different structures and means which
may be found necessary or convenient for irrigation and other purposes.''
It will thus be seen that the corporation was not, by its
articles, authorized to own the water in its systems but
only to manage, regulate, control and distribute the
waters, under the doctrine announced in the ease of
East River Bottom Water Co. vs. Boyce, et al, supra;
fro:m. which we have qu,oted, th~ water under the Indianola Irrigation Company was appurtenant to the land
of its stockholders. ·The water represented by certificates of stock in the Indianola Irrigation Company, is,
as a matter of law, appU+tenant to the la:qd, -upon which
such water has been and is being used.
In the case of E~ast River Bo~ttom Water Oo'. V'S.
Boyce, ·et al, it will be noted that the majority opinion
holds that a water right is not severed from being
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appurtenant to land where the corporation is merely
given the right to manage and control the water. It may
or may not be that this court judicially or personally
knows that when that case was decided many of the
banks throughout the state that had loaned money on
certificates of stock in irrigation companies became
alarmed because under the doctrine of that case their
security might become valueless. Be that as it may at
the next session of the legislature following the rendering of that opinion the legislature amended Sectiotn
U.C.A. 1943, 100-1-10 so that the same should provide
as follows:
''Water rights shall be transferred by deed
in substantially the same manner as real estate,
except when they are represented by shares of
stock in a corporation, iln which case water shaU
not be deemed to be app~.~trtenant to the lood, and
such deeds shall be recorded in. books kept for
that purpose in the office of the recorder of the
county where the place of diversion of the water
from its natural channel is situated and in the
county where the water is applied. Every deed of
a water right so recorded shall, from the time
of filing the same with the recorder for record
impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof
and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien
holders shall be deemed to purchase and take with
notice thereof.'' Laws of Utah 1943, Chapter 105,
page 154.

'

I

'"I

jj

The language in italics was added by the amendment of 1943. U.C.A. 1943, 100-1-11 was not amended.
It remained as it had been and provide's as follows:
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"A right to the use of water appurtenant to
land shall pass to the grantee of such land, and, in
eases where such right has been exercised in irrigating different parcels of land at different times,
such right shall pass to the grantee of any parcel of land on which such right was exercised
next preceeding the time of the execution of any
conveyance thereof; subject, however, in all cases
to payment by the grantee in any such conveyance
of all amounts unpaid on any assessment then due
upon any such right, provided, that any such
right to the use of water, or any part thereof, may
be reserved by the grantor in any such conveyance by making such reservation in express terms
in such conveyance, or it may be separately conveyed.''

THE AMEND~fENT TO SECTION 100-1-10, U.C.A.
1943, i\IADE BY THE 1943 LEGISLATURE DOES
NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF MAKING WATER
WHICH WAS IN FACT APPURTENANT TO LAND,
NOT APPURTENANT.
There can be no doubt that from earliest times the
courts of this state and territory have held that water
represented by stock in an irrigation company may be
and usually is appurtenant to the lands upon which the
water is used. Mutual companies were organized throuout the west for the purpose of distributing and managing the water of the corporate members, such is the expressed purpose of the incorporators of the Indianola
Irrigation Company. It has been uniformly held that the
stockholders are tenants in common of the water. See
Smithfield West Field lrr. Co. vs. Un~on Central Life,
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105 Ut1ah 468; Genota Town vs. Santaquim City, 96 Utah
88, 80 P. 2d 930. Certainly no farmer in turning over to a

mutual company the right to distribute and manage his
water ever intended to sever the water from the land. The
Utah cases cited above all recognize this when they hold
that water represented by stock is. nevertheless still appurtenant to the land upon which used. As will be hereinafter shown the legisla~ure could not change the nature
of the contract made by the stockholders among themselves· in their articles without running afoul of the constitutional limitation which prohibits the impairment of
the obligation of eon tract. This should be kept in mind in
approaching the problem of the construction of section
100-1-10, as amended by the laws of 1943, wherein it is
provided that water represented by stock in a corporation shall not be deemed appurtenant to land.
The word ''deemed'' has been given two well recognized meanings by the authorities and the one which is to
be adopted in any particular instance depends upon the
context. The two meanings are recognized by the standard law dictionaries. In 9 Ameriown .and English En-c.
165 it is defined· as follows:
. '' To deem means to judge; to determine
upon conside·ration; to form a judgment; to conclude upon consideration. The term is also used
in the ordina:ry sense of to think to suppose; to
hold opinion. ''
This same definition is cited in Bouvier, New Uuw
Diotiofl!ary, 1934. See also Webster, New IntBrn.atiJonal
Dict.iowary, which is as follows:
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'·1. To pass judg~nent; to render decision ;
to act as judge or arbit.or.
2. To have an opinion, to judge, believe,
pose • • "

su~

In 13 Cyc. 756 the term is defined as to adjudge and
also to suppose, to believe, to think.
CASES HOLDING THAT THE WORDS
''SHALL BE DEEMED''
RAISE ONLY A. REBUTTABLE PRESUl\IPTION
"J;Jiller vs. Commonw,ealth, 2 S.E. 2d, 343, 172
l7a. 639. Statute providing that liquor in containers not bearing the required government stamps (
shall be deemed to have been illegally acquired,
created a presumption subject to being overcome
by opposing evidence rather than a conclusive
presumption.

In re Barbour's Estate: 173 N.Y.S. 280, 185
.App. Div. 445. A tax statute provided that every
person ''shall be deemed'' to have died a resident
of New York upon living in N.Y. the greater part
of any 12 consecutive months in the 24 months
next preceding his death. Held this merely raised
a presumption which could be overcome by proof
that decedent was not in fact a resident.
Kleepe vs. Odin tp., McHenry Cownty, N.D.
169 N. W. 313. Held that the language ''and in
case the board having jurisdiction shall fail to
file such order within 20 days they shall be deemed
to have decided against such application'' raised .
a rebuttable presumption ''that can be overcome
with evidence to the contrary.''
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Cooper vs. Slaughter, 57 So. 477. Jury was
charged that if it believed that a boundary line
the location of which was involved in the action'
was in dispute and that the adjoining owner~
caused it to be established and acquiesced in the
line as established the plaintiff would be ''deemed" the owners. Held that "deemed" as there
used was the ·equivalent of ''presumed.'' 'The appellant argued on appeal that the jury had been
erroneously instructed that as a matter of law the
plaintiff would be the owner, because the word
deemed meant ''considered'' or ''adjudged.''

I''

I

::
I

Banr·ell vs. Pittsburg, 62 Pa. St. 474. "But
after the death of the husband the wife's legal
settlement shall be deemed to be the place where
he was last legally settled. This is equivalent to
the expression 'shall be taken to be' and admits
of the existence of a dif!erent state of facts,
namely, a settlement acquired by a widow herself.'' To the same effect see Miffin vs. Elizabeth
18 Pa. St. 17.
~ackson vs. Succ~essvon, 47 La. Am. 1089. A
statute said that a legacy made to a creditor
should not be deemed to be.in compensation of the
debt nor a legacy to a servant to be deemed to be
in payment of wages. The court said: ''The word
deemed, used in the article simply means no
interpretation unfavorable to a creditor shall be
placed on the testament by the fact alone of the
legacy to .the creditor. It is a question of interpretation.''

The above cases are representative of the many
cases holding that the language ''shall be deemed''
raises only a priina facie presumption which is subject to
rebutal. · In each of the above cases it had been argued
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

105

that the language rai8ed a conclusive presumption, but
the contention wa8 rejected. There are, of coursf', easps
in which there is no roon1 for construction and in whic'h
it clearly appears fron1 the context whether it was intended to be a conclusive presun1ption or merely a prima
facie one. In criminal eases for example where it could
not constitutionally be conclusively presumed that a man
is guilty, the court uniformly hold that the use of the
word ''deemed'' raises only a prima facie presumption.
In other types of cases the context clearly shows that the
word ''deemed'' was intended to raise a conclusive presumption.
For example in Irwin vs. Pickwick Stages, 25 P. 2d
998 (Cal.), a motor v;ehicle registration law provided
that title shall be ''deemed'' not to have passed until
certificate issues to transferee. This was held to raise a
conclusive presumption. The court cited: In re Green's
Estate, 164 N.Y.S. 1063; in re Waldron's Estate, 84 Colo.
1, 267 P. 191; McCluskey v~. Hunter, 33 Ariz. 513, 266 P.
18; Kerchloff-Cuzner ~Iill & Lumber Co. vs Olmstead,
85 Cal. 80, 25 P. 648. The Colorado case of In re W aidron's Estate cites many other cas1es to the same effect.
In Harder vs. Irwin, 285 F. 502, 504 the court held
that "deemed" when relating t:o language that a distribution of dividends should be "deemed" to hav;e been
made from the most recently accumulated undivided
profits, raised a conclusive presumption. 'That it means
•'considered" or "adjudged". In accord are Leonard vs.
Grant, 4 F. 11; U. S. vs. Doherty, 27 F. 730. In King vs.
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McElroy 21 p. 2d, 80, 37 N. M. 238, it was held that where
a Htatute deems a thing denied it is adjudged denied.
From the above cases and dictionary definitions it
is clear that two distinct meanings have been given to the
term. The one meaning is that it but raised a prima
facie presumption or supposes a thing to be true. The
other considers the word to raise a conclusive presumption. Which meaning is to be adopted in any particular
case depends upon ordinary rules· of statutory construetion. The word itself has no clear cut definite meaning
to be given in all cases. Clearly from the cases it is susceptible of more than one meaning. Whether in a given
case the presumption it raises is prima facie or conclu,
sive cannot be answered merely by noting the use of the
word. Other rules of statutory construction must be used
because the word "deemed" has no s.et and definite
meaning. It is worthy of note that if the legislature had
intended the word "deemed" as conclusive there was no
occasion to use the word ''deemed'' at all. It could have
provided that water represented by shares of stock in a
corporation shall not be appurtenant to land. It did not
so provide, apparently because it did not so intend.
1

I:
I
1

It will be noted that the provisions of U.C.A. 1943,
100-1-10 deals solely with a conveyance of a water right
independent of conveyance of land. The apparent purpose was to overcome any inference that may be drawn
from the East Riv:er Bottom case that a water right
represented by a certificate of stock could not be transferred hy a transfer of the stock.
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OF THE TWO RECOGNIZED ~lEANINGS FOR THE
WORD ''DEEMED'' THE COURT IN CONSTRUING
THE 1943 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 100-1-10
MUST HOLD THAT IT RAISES ONLY A PRIMA
FACIE PRESUMPTION.

4

It is universally recognized and established that the
articles of incorporation constitute a contract; (a) between the corporation and the state; (b) between the
corporation and the stockholders ; (c) between the stockholders and the state; (d) between the state and third
persons who have dealt with the corporation on the
faith of the grant; (e) between the stockholders themselves. Thompson on Corpora.t~o'hS, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, page
417. In Carey vs. Min. Co., 32 Ut. 497, 91 P. 369, 12 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 554, it is said:

"The charter of a corporation having capital.
stock is a contract between three parties and
forms the basis of three distinct contracts. ·The
charter is a contract between the state and the
corporation; second, it is a contract between the
corporation and the stockholders; third, .it is a
contract between the stockholders and the state.''
When the individual farmer joined a mutual corporatio,n to distribute and manage his water, he did not contract, according to the existing Utah cases, to sever his
water from his land so that it would no longer he appurtenant. His contract was of such a nature that the wate~r
remained appurtenant ·even though represented by sto~k.
This was recognized by the case cited above including _
two most recent Utah cases, East River B:otttorm
Boyce,

v·s ..
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102 Ut·ah 149; 128 P. 2d 277, and Milford State Bank vs.
West Field Canal & Irr. Co., 108 Utah 528, 162 P. 2d, 101.
It is uniformly held by all the cases that a statute
which materially changes the contract made by the stockholders in the articles of incorporation is an impairment
of the obligation of contract within the meaning of the
constitutional limitations contained in both the state and
federal constitutions. See Fletche.r on Corporation, Vl()l.
7, Sec 3657; Garey vs. Mining Oompam;y, 32 Ut. 497, 91 P.
369, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 554; Superior W<ater, Light ami/,
Power vs. City .of Superior, 263 U.. S. 125, 68 L. Ed. 204,
44 8. Ct. 82.
If then it be admitted, as well it must, that many of
the mutual companies had articles which left the water
still appurtenant to the land upon which used, the legislature would have no constitutional power to enact a
statute which would impair this relationship and change
it by severing water which the stockholders had chosen
to leave appurtenant to land, from the land. That this
would be so is clearly demonstrated by our Utah Supreme
Court in the Carey vs. J\Ening Company case supra.
(There is much good language in this case. We quote
only a small portion of thde dif'scus) sion. Cas.es from many
states are cited and quote rom :

1

'

I

.

''In the cas:e of DaJrtmovuth Oolleg~e vs. Woo·dr
ward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 4 L. Ed. 629, it was
held that the charter from a state to a private
corporation created a contract within the meaning of the federal constitution, forbidding any
state to pass any law impairing the obligation of
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contracts, and hence the federal Constitution prevented a change by legislative enactment of a
charter so issued. ' '
''From the texts and the cases it will be seen
that under the reservation the state is not only
unathorized to alter or amend charters of existing
corporations in such a way as will change the
fundamental character of the corporation, impair
the object of the grant, or rights vested thereunder, but it is also unauthorized to alter or amend
them in such a way as will impair the contractual
relations or rights of the stockholders a111ong
themselves, or between the corporation and its
stockholders; and it will also be seen that under
the reserved power the Legislature has only the
right to amend the charter, or laws with respect
thereto, which it would have had in the event it
had been decided in the Dartmouth College Case
that the federal Constitution did not apply to corporate charters. The Dartmouth College case did
not call in question nor involve any right or relation of the corporators among themselves. It involved only the relation of the corporation and the
state. Without the reservation it was held that
even such relation cannot be changed without
doing violence to the federal Constitution. Because of the reserved power the state many now
amend or alter the charter, so .far as affecting the
contract with itself, and so long as it does not
change the fundamental character of the corporation or impair any vested rights acquired thereunder. But, as ·stated by the authorities, the right
is reserved for the benefit of the state and of the
public and for public purposes. The power can
only be exercised to the extent that the state is interested.''
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''Bearing in mind that the corporate charter
is a dual contract--one between the sta:te and the
corporation and its stockholders, the other between the corporation and its stockholders--and
that under the res,erved power the state may alter
or amend the former, but not the latter, the question is : Under which do the legislative enactment
of 1930 and the action 'taken by the majority of
the stockholders fall~ We are of the opinion that
they do not pertain to any right, privilege, or immunity which the state had granted to the corporation or to its stockholders,and that the action by
such stockholders in no wis.e affected or was re- 1''
lated to the contract existing between the state
and the corporation. It merely pertains to and
affects the contract existing among the stockholders themselves.''
''In the original articles of incorporation each
stockholder agreed, one with the other, that his
full-paid capital stock should be nonassessable.
This provision might have been omitted or inserted as the corporators saw fit to agree among
themselves. Neither the state nor the public were
concerned, whether they agreed upon one or the
other. No franchise or privilege granted by the
state to the defendant or its members was dependent upon this provision. The same grant, franchise, and privil·eges would have been granted had
the provision been omitted. Had it been omitted,
no other or greater liability would have been
created in favor of the creditors or the public
than was created by its insertion. 8uch a stipulation did not, then, in any wise pertain to the
contract between the state and the corporation.
It was manif!estly intended to concern and fix the
reciprocal rights of the stockJwlders among themselves, and 'to place a limit upon the amount of

I~

j
I
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money or capital that each was required to put
into the enterprise and contrib~te to the corporation. The whole consideration for the agreement
that no further contribution of capital to the
corporation should be exacted was the mutual
promise of the stookholders, the one to the other.
Neither the state nor the public had anything to
do with it. nor was either in any wise concerned
therewith. The corporators had the undoubted
right, as among themselves, to stipulate and
agree as to the extent of their contributions.''
Since a construction tha~ the legislature intended by
use of the word "deemed" to raise a conclusive presumption that stock in a water company could not be
appurtenant to land would be of doubtful constitutionality, the court should adopt the other construction, that
there is merely a presumption that it is p.ot appurtenant. The legislature would not have the power; and common sense dictates that the court not impute to the legislature the intent to sever water which was in fact appurtenant to the land. The stockholders in organizing
mutual companies elected to· leave their water rights
appurtenant to their lands. Thousands. of mutual companies were organized all over the west. Courts from
every western state have held that the water in such
mutual companies is held by the stockholders as tenants
in common--that it is in most cases still appur±enant to
the land upon which used. No legislature could impair the
obligation of contract and defeat the stockholders intent
'
to have the wat·er remrun appurtenant.
The legislature was without authority to deprive
John Edison Spencer of the water right conveyed to
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him in 1933 by both the certificate numbered 73 and the
deed. (See John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 12). Such an
atternpt would offend against Article One, Section 10
and the 5th and 14th Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States and Article 1, Section 7 and 18 of
the Constitution of Utah. In th_is connection see also
deed to Elizabeth A. Tibbs copied into the transcript at
pages 35-61.

It is a well established rule of statutory construction
that if one possible construction, would render a statute
of doubtful constitutionality and another equally logical
construction would leave the constitutionality of the
statute free from doubt, the courts should adopt the
latter construction. The legislature may constitutionally
raise a presumption that water represented by stock in a
corporation is not appurtenant. It could not as to companies already organized conclusively presume that the
water was not appurtenant to the land. The court should
therefore adopt the view that t~e language of the statute means at most only that it will be presumed that
water repres·ented by stock is not appurtenant, but that
this presumption can be rebutted.

.!

In this case the evidence is all to the effect that the
water right in dispute was at all times used on the land
owned by Spencer and his successors in interest, and'
therefore the same was appurtenant to such lands.
It will also be noted that the amendment of 1943
does not have any retroactive effect. See U.C.A. 1943,
88-2-3. The certificates of stock here involved were all
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issued before the runendment of 194~~. See also eases
cited in foot notes to U.C.A. lD-!3, 88-2-3.
''Certificates of stock, together with the
charter or articles of incorporation and -the statute under which the corporation was organized
are evidence of a contract between the corporation
and the persons named therein or subsequent
holders thereof by proper assignment or transfer
and between the various stockholders, etc.'' 14
C. J. page 479, Sec. 699 and 18 C.J.S. page 723,
Sec. 258, S1Jhdivis-ion (b).
- INDEPENDENT OF THE LAW AS TO APPURTEN- ANCY OF ATER TO LAND EDISON SPENCER
- AND ELIZABETH A. TIBBS OWN THE WATER
REPRESENTED BY THE CERTIFICATES.

'y

Of the 448 acres of water right decreed to Richard
H. Spencer there are now outst.andjng the following
_ certificates: No. 86 for 160 shares, 84 for 125 shares, 73
for 80 shares, 72 for 80 shares and 3 acres of uncertificated water right; total 448 acres or shares.
Uuder the evidence in this case there can he no
serious doubt about Edison Spencer being the owner of
certificates numbered 73 for 80 shares of stock and certificate numbered 86 for 160 shares of stock.
As to certificate numbered 73 it recites that Edison
"' S~ncer is the pledgee. The evidence further shows that
it was delivered to Irwin M. Price as security for money
borrowed from Price by Richard H. Spencer. If and
when the loan was paid by Richard H. Spencer to Irwin

.
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M. Price the title to certificate numbered 73 which was
given by Edison to Price to secure his father's loan reverted to Edison. Richard H. Spencer could not acquire
title to the certificate thus loaned to him to secure his obligation by the process of paying off the loan. There is
nothing in that certificate which even remotely shows
that Richard H. Spencer has any right, title or interest
therein. Price having disclaimed any interest in that
certificate the same belongs to Edison Spencer.
~

I~

Moreover in 1933 R. H. Spencer by warranty deed
conveyed 80 shares of water in Thistle Creek to John
Edison Spencer (See John Edison Spencer Exhibit 12).
That one may convey a certificate of stock by any writing not on the certificate itself is provided by U.C.A.
1943, 18-3-1 and 1943, 18-3-16.
What has been said about the ownership of certificate numbered 73 applies to certificate 86 for 160 shares
of stock. That certificate has been assigned to Edison
and the land upon which the same has been and is being
used has been conveyed to Edison who in consideration
of such transfer and conveyance assumed and paid off
the obligation that stood against the certificate and land
at the time the conveyance was made.
As to certificate 72 for 80 shares a slightly different
question ·is presented. The evidenee shows that such
certificate was during the course of this· litigation for
the most part in the possession of couns,e1 for Edison
Spencer, Richard H. Spencer and Irwin M. Price. A
futile attempt was mad·e at the trial to show that Irwin
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M. Price had not employed counsel. \V e shall not enlarge
upon what we haYe already said with re~pect to the
affidavit of Price which, of coursr. was not competent
evidence, except to show that he did not claim any water
right.
As to certificate numbered 72 the evidence without
dispute shows that R. H. Spencer so far as he was able
to do ga\e the water represented by such certificate to
~Irs. Tibbs, not only by conveying to 1\Irs. Tibbs the
land upon which the water was used but by word of
mouth. He also gave ~Irs. Tibbs a deed in which he
conveyed to her 20 shares of primary water right. The
deed is dated :Jiay 21, 1931. (Tr. 35). The evidence further shows that Richard H. Spencer was enjoined from
transferring any water right. It may well be that the
injunciion in such particular was a nullity, but Richard
H. Spencer could not be expected to take the chance of
being punished for contempt if and when he made a formal transfer of the water. It is contended by plaintiff,
to which contention, we do not agree, that Richard H.
Spencer did not claim such water right is conclusively
made evident by the fact that as late as 1944 he disclaimed any and all right to the water represented by
such certificate. If, as the plaintiff claims, Richard H.
Spencer solemnly disclaimed any and all interest in
certificate numbered 72 in 1944 it is indeed difficult to
concieve of any law th3:t would permit the administrator
of his estate to successfully maintain a claim that he had
such an interest. In this connection it will be recalled
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that there is a total absence of any evidence showing or
tending to sho'Y that Richard H. Spencer acquired any
right, title or interest in certificate numbered 72 and 73
since he filed his disclaimer in this action. The administrator of the estate of Richard H. Spencer having offered
in evidence the affidavit of Price to the effect that Price
relinquished all right he had in certificates numbered
72and 73 in 1941 it follows .that if R. H. Spencer did
make the disclaimer as contended for by the plaintiff
the administrator could not successfully set aside such
disclaimer. Therefore if, as appears, Price relinquished
his claim to certificates numbered 72 and 73 in 1941 and
if as plaintiff contends Richard H. Spencer disclaimed
any interest in certificates numbered 72 and 73 in 1944
and there is no evidence whatsover that Richard H.
Spencer has acquired any interest in certificates 72 and
73 since he madei his alleged dis·claimer in 1944 it necessarily follows that the administrator of the estate of
Richard H. Spencer has. completely failed to show any
title or interest in either certificates 72 or 73.

.

On the other hand the evidence shows without conflict that Edison Spencer had an agreement with Irwin
M. Price in July, 1946 just after the death of Richard H.
Spencer wher·ein and whereby Edison Spencer agreed to
carry on the litigation then pending in court to clear
up the title to such certificate to pay the costs of such
litigation and if successful to pay to Bonnie, the minor
daughter of Irwin M. Price, the sum of $1000.00 and
trans.fer certificate 72 to his siste·r, Mrs. Tibbs, and that
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such arrangement had received the approval of Richard
H. Spencer prior to his death. That Edison Spencer is
carrying out his part of such agreement is obvious in
that he is prosecuting this action notwithstanding if he
is successful he will be out the expenses he is put to in
so doing and will not even if successful receive the water
right represented by certificate numbered 72.
Coming now to certificate number,ed 84. The evidence shows that such certificate was delivered to Edison
Spencer by his father prior to his death; that Edison
took the certificate to Mr. Houtz, the secretary of the
Indianola Irrigation Company, to have the same transferred but the secretary refused to transfer the same.
There is language in the decree entered in case numbered
2888 which seems to enjoin Richard H. Spencer from
transferring any water rights. We doubt that the court
had jurisdiction to issue such injunction but it may be
that Richard H. Spencer hesitated to make any transfer
of such certificate or any certificate for fear that he
might he cited into court for contempt.
During the course of the trial counsel for the administrator of the estate of Richard H. Spencer attempted
to impeach the testimony of Mrs. Louise Spencer, the
wife of Edison, by reading to her some purported testimony given at the time of the hearing had on the petition
to appoint an administrator and on the hearing had in
the proceedings wherein it was sought to ascertain the
nature and amount of property owned by Richard H.
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ceeding Mrs. 'Spencer gave evidence touching the papers
that were delivered by Richard H. Spencer to his son
Edison and Mrs. Tibbs after the same were received from
Mr. Beal. It was such pa:pers that were apparently being
inquired about. The fact that Mrs'. Spencer testified that
no other papers were, then delivered may not be said to
detract from her testimony. She, was not asked about any
water certificate; that she had in mind the deeds and
papers brought from Mr. Beal's ·office is made evident
by the fact that she did not mention the assignment of
the ear mark which assignment was executed at about
that time. Moreover the circumstances surrounding the
delivery of the deeds and the certificate for 125 shares
tends to corroborate the t,estimony of Edison Spencer
and his wife.
It is difficult to concieve of Mr. Spencer, the father,
transferring to his daughter and ·son the land which he
conveyed to them and then make such l~d worth only a
fractional part of what they are worth as irrigated
land by withholding the water right used. thereon. Such
a tJ.'Iansaction is contrary to all human ·experience. The
evidence shows that the land in question was of the probable value of $100.00 per acre with a water right and
from $10.00 to $20.00 without a water right. ('Tr. 814 to
818 and 820 to 821) It is submitted that it is extremely
improbable that Richard H. Spencer intended any such
results on th~ eve of his passing away.
Moredver the record shows that Richard II. Spencer
had had considerable trouble and litigation touching his
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water rights. It is difficult to concieve of Mr. Spencer,
the elder, Jiot n1aking some provision of the manner in
which such water rights should be disposed of if and
when the same could be transferred. In this connection
the attention of the court is directed to U.C.A. 1943, 18-39 wherein it is provided:
''The delivery of a certificate by the person
appearing by the certificate to be the owner thereof without the indorsement requisite for the transfer of the certificate and the shares represented
thereby but with intent to transfer such certificate or sh~es shall impose an obligation, in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, upon
the person so delivering to complete the transfer
by making the necessary indorsement. The tr,ansfer shall take effect as of the time when the indo'rsement is actually made. This obligation may
be specifically enforced.''
Thus if, as the evidence shows, stock certificate No.
84 was delivered to Edison Spencer with the intention
that he should have the water represented thereby then
it follows that he is entitled to the w·ater represented
thereby. See also in this connection U.C.A. 1943, 18-3-10.
If it be said that Edison disclaimed the right to
certificate numbered 73 in the disclaimer filed 'in 1944,
the same as did his father, it will be noted that at that
time the stock certificate appeared to be owned by Price;
that Price wa~ willing to relinquish his claim thereto
only on condition that Edison pay to Bonnie, the daughter of Price, the sum of $1000.00 and deliver certificate
No. 72 to Mrs. Tibbs. It was after the disclaimer filed
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in 1944 that Edison made the agreement with Price. In
this connection the attention of the court is directed to
the testiffiony of Edison at the· time of the hearing of
the petition for the appointment of· an administrator and
the proceeding had for the discovery of the assets of the
estate. The fact should not he overlooked that Elizabeth
A. Tibbs kept house for her father for many years. (Tr.
879) and that John Edison Spencer, who was 42 years
of age at the time of the trial, had spent his matured
years in helping his father to acquire and save the property which he owned at the time of his death. (Tr. 597)
At the trial counsel for the administrator seemed to
place considerable stress on the evidence of Edison at
the time proceedings were had for the appointment of an
administrator to the effect that he claimed only some
three acres of uncertified water. Doubtless Edison had
in mind the water right to which he had the legal title.
Nothing could possibly he gained by Edison representing
that he disclaimed the right to acquire the legal title to
the water right which he now claims. Ther·e could be no
conceivable reason for him to disclaim the right to pursue
his legal right to acquire the water right which he is here
seeking.
In conclusion it is the contention of Edison Spencer
and Elizabeth A. Tibbs:
1.

That the Hadlock mortgage is void for uncer-

tainity.
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2. That the decree of foreclosure is void for ambiguity and uncertainity in so far as it relates to 60
shares or acres of water.
3. That the plaintiff herein may not, under the
guise of a suit to quiet title, in effect amend, modify or
render certain either the Hadlock mortgage or the decre~e
of foreclosure in case 2888 civil, because:

(a) The court is without power at this late date to
in effect modify, amend or render cert·ain such decree.
(b) That the plaintiff not being a party to the
mortgage foreclosure proceeding may not be heard to
complain about its terms.
(c) That the only evidence permissible to ascertain
the meaning of the decree of foreclosure is the judgment
roll itself and such judgment roll is fatally defective in
that it does not disclose t~e subject matter of the foreclosure proceedings.
(d)

That there is no pleading in the Hadlock com-

plaint to foreclose on any particular shares or acres of
water right.
That the deed made by Spencer and his wife to
the Indianola Irrigation Company is void for uncertainity.
4.

5. That in any event the decree entered in this cas'e
may not be affirmed because it awards to the plaintiff
and Hugentobler more water than they are entitled to
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and by ~such decree all of the water rights in Thistle
Creek and it tributaries are clouded.
6. That the water right represented by the certificates of stock is appurtenant to the land upon which
such water right is and has been us.ed, which land now is
owned by Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs.
7. That ev~en if it should be held, contrary to our
contention, that the water right represented by the certificates is not appurtenant to the land Edison Spencer
and Elizabeth A. Tibbs, are' the equitable owners of sueh
certificates and entitled to have their titles thereto
quieted, p~ovided,. that John EdiS'on Spencer shall when
such title is quieted, pay to Bonnie, the minor daughter
of Irwin M. Price, the sum of $1000 and transfer certificate No. 72 to Elizabeth A. Tibbs.
8. That the administrator of the estate of Richard
H. Spencer has completely failed to establish any interest in any of the water right in question.
9. That the judgment for costs awarded against
John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs should
be reversed.
10. That Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs
are entitled to a judgment for their costs herein expended.
Respectfully submitted,
Elias Hansen
Atto,rney for Defendents and
'appellants, John Edis,on Spencer
and Elizabeth A. Tibbs
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